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INTRODUCTION
Over the last several years, taxpayers who invested in failed tax
shelters have brought an avalanche of malpractice cases against their
1
advising lawyers and accountants.
In conjunction with more
2
stringent statutory penalties, heightened disclosure requirements in
3
the tax and securities regulatory regimes, and stricter ethical
1. It is impossible to determine with any specificity the actual number of tax
shelter malpractice suits, if only because most of the disputes were resolved by terms
of arbitration agreements or otherwise settled. If one accounts for class action suits,
the number of published cases, both federal and state, run into the hundreds. This
figure surely, however, undercounts the number of disputes. Indeed, the take-up
rate associated with IRS amnesty programs for tax shelter participants indicates that
tax shelter malpractice disputes numbered into the thousands. These amnesty
programs and global settlements allowed taxpayers who participated in abusive tax
shelters to come forward and pay the tax and interest owed on back taxes. In return,
the IRS typically refrained from applying otherwise associated penalties. See I.R.S.
Announcement 2005-80, 2005-46 I.R.B. 967–71 (stating that taxpayers who settled
had to pay 100% of taxes owed, interest, and, depending on the transaction, either
one-quarter or one-half of the penalty the IRS otherwise would seek). Huge
numbers of taxpayers seized the opportunity for amnesty, with 2000 (out of an
estimated 4000) investors in twenty-one different tax shelters turning themselves in
and paying over $2 billion in back taxes and interest. Stephen Joyce, About 2,000
Taxpayers to Pay $2 Billion in Global Settlement Initiative, Everson Says, 59 DAILY TAX REP.
(BNA) G-2 (Mar. 28, 2006). More impressive still, approximately 85% of taxpayers
known by the IRS to have purchased the “Son of BOSS” tax shelter elected to settle
under a different program rather than litigate the issue with the government,
coughing up more than $4 billion. I.R.S. News Release IR-2005-72 (July 11, 2005);
I.R.S. Announcement 2004-46, 2004-21 I.R.B. 964.
It is reasonable to assume that a significant number of these former shelter
investors subsequently sued their tax advisers for malpractice to recoup, at the very
least, fees associated with the failed tax shelter advice. See Denney v. Deutsche Bank
AG, 443 F.3d 253, 262 (2006) (revealing that “class counsel for over 1000 claimants
argue [for immediate settlement acceptance]”); see also Cassell Bryan-Low, Unhappy
Returns: Accounting Firms Face Backlash over the Tax Shelters They Sold, Suits by Users Being
Audited Are Multiplying, and IRS Steps Up Its Regulation, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2003, at A1
(reporting that disgruntled clients were initiating lawsuits against their former
accounting firms for advice related to questionable tax shelter investments); David
Cay Johnston, Wealthy Sue Accountants over Shelters: Disputes on Tax Moves That I.R.S.
Disallowed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at C1 (predicting a “flood” of malpractice cases);
Allen Kenney, Korb Predicts Shelter Malpractice Suits, 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 216-2
(stating that in the aftermath of the successful settlement initiatives, the IRS chief
counsel predicted “a rash of malpractice suits against tax advisers”).
2. See I.R.C. § 6662 (Supp. 2005) (imposing a 20% penalty for understatements
of tax pertaining to any listed transaction and any other reportable transaction (with
the penalty increasing to 30% if certain disclosure requirements are not met)); I.R.C.
§ 6707A (Supp. IV 2004) (imposing a series of monetary penalties for failure to
include on any return or statement any information required to be disclosed under
I.R.C. § 6011 with respect to a reportable transaction); I.R.C. § 6695A (West 2008)
(imposing a penalty on appraisers equal to the lesser of (1) the greater of $1000 or
10% of the amount of tax underpaid by reason of the incorrect valuation or
(2) 125% of the gross income received by the person who prepared the appraisal).
3. See I.R.C. § 6111 (Supp. 2005) (requiring each material adviser with respect
to any reportable transaction to register the transaction with the IRS); § 6707A(e)(2)
(explaining that if the taxpayer paid certain tax shelter–related penalties and is also
required to file periodic reports under section 13 or section 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 or is required to be consolidated with another person for
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4

standards for tax practitioners, these civil lawsuits have
fundamentally transformed the nature of tax practice. The risk of
potential tax shelter malpractice claims, particularly in the aftermath
of several high-profile congressional and Treasury Department
5
investigations, has prompted tax professionals in law and accounting
firms to impose strict governance procedures and internal controls.
In particular, these firms and their members have instituted rigorous
new procedures governing the issuance of legal opinions supporting
6
aggressive tax-planning strategies, as well as stringent oversight of
7
practitioner adherence to new ethical standards. Furthermore, as an
purposes of those reports, the taxpayer must disclose these payments on future
Security and Exchange Committee submissions).
4. See generally Treas. Dep’t Circular No. 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10 (2008) (authorizing
the Secretary of the Treasury to regulate the practice of representatives before the
Treasury Department).
5. See MINORITY STAFF OF PERM. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. TAX SHELTER
INDUSTRY: THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTANTS, LAWYERS AND FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS, FOUR
KPMG CASE STUDIES: FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS AND SC2, S. REP. NO. 108-34 (2003); DEP’T OF
THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS (1999), http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/
ctswhite.pdf.
6. The most important and largest shake-up involved the deferred prosecution
agreement that the accounting firm KPMG signed in August 2005 with the
Department of Justice as part of the government’s multi-billion dollar criminal tax
fraud investigation involving abusive tax shelters. See Letter from David N. Kelley,
U.S. Attorney, S. Dist. of N.Y., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Robert S. Bennett, Attorney,
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom L.L.P. (Aug. 26, 2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/August05/kpmgdpagmt.pdf.
The
signed agreement is a remarkable document and imposes permanent restrictions on
KPMG’s tax practice, including requiring the firm to cease (with limited exceptions)
its private client tax practice as well as its compensation and benefits practice. Id. at
4–9. It also requires KPMG (1) to refrain from developing, marketing, selling, or
implementing prepackaged tax products; (2) to restrict severely its tax preparation
services; and (3) to apply significantly elevated standards to its tax practice. Id. In
addition, as a result of the government’s preliminary investigation into its tax shelter
activities, KPMG dismissed a number of senior tax officials. See I.R.S. News Release
IR-2005-83 (Aug. 29, 2005); Lynnley Browning, How Accounting Firms Went from
Resistance to Resignation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2005, at A1; Sheryl Stratton, KPMG
Sacrifices Tax Leadership in Ongoing Shelter Controversy, 2004 TAX NOTES TODAY 8-1. And
in 2005, also as part of the government investigation, KPMG “instituted firm-wide
structural, cultural and governance reforms to ensure the highest ethical standards,”
including “significant change in its business practices.” KPMG Responds to Tax Shelter
Investigation, 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 116-31. For another example of the recent
fundamental restructuring of tax practice at the nation’s largest accounting firms,
the accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PwC”), as part of a $10 million
settlement with the Treasury Department in 2002, agreed with the Department of
Justice to overhaul its internal quality-control procedures. Senate PSI Report Targets
Firms Involved in Tax Shelter ‘Industry,’ 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 28, 28; see also PERM.
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONAL FIRMS IN THE U.S. TAX
SHELTER INDUSTRY, S. REP. NO. 109-54, at 93–96 (2005) (reporting the various
changes made by PwC). Similarly, as part of its $15 million settlement with the
government in 2003, accounting firm Ernst & Young (“E&Y”) agreed to systematic
reforms of its tax practice. S. REP. NO. 109-54, at 85–87 nn.348–61.
7. Firms expend time and resources discussing, debating, and reevaluating their
conduct and advice vis-à-vis these standards, which are promulgated by the
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additional measure of protection, these firms have ceased (at least for
the time-being) aggressive, large-scale, coordinated client solicitations
8
for marketed tax shelters.
9
While tax shelter malpractice litigation is nothing new, the
generation of cases that arose after the passage of the Tax Reform Act
10
The
of 1986 (“1986 Act”) stands apart from its predecessors.
professional associations as well as the Treasury Department. For example, pursuant
to Circular 230, the Treasury regulations governing tax practice, every piece of
written correspondence and electronic e-mail produced by tax practitioners now
includes a ubiquitous “‘no penalty reliance’ legend,” which tells the recipient that
she cannot rely on the communication or its contents for the ultimate validity of the
benefits or for purposes of avoiding tax penalties. See Sheryl Stratton, Circular 230 EMails, T-Shirts Attain ‘Legendary’ Status, 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 127-1. For additional
examples of how Circular 230 has influenced daily tax practice, see, for example,
Susan T. Edlavitch & Brian S. Masterson, Circular 230 “Best Practices” and Written
Advice Standards, in REPRESENTING THE GROWING BUSINESS: TAX, CORPORATE,
SECURITIES, AND ACCOUNTING ISSUES 775 (ALI-ABA 2007); Bruce D. Pingree, Circular
230 and Tax Shelter Issues in Benefits, in CURRENT PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW
AND PRACTICE 1059 (ALI-ABA 2006); Dan W. Holbrook, Imagine the Worst the U.S.
Treasury Could Do to Us—They’ve Done It: Revenge of the IRS: Circular 230 Changes Law
Practice, TENN. B.J., Aug. 2005, at 28; Edward M. Manigault & Steve R. Akers, Circular
230—How It Changed Our Lives (or at Least Our Practices), PROB. & PROP., May–June
2006, at 32.
8. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 108-34, at 23 (2003) (indicating that KPMG disbanded its
sales group formerly responsible for promoting abusive tax shelters); Sheryl Stratton,
Nine Tax Professionals Indicted; KPMG Admits Shelters Were Fraudulent, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Aug. 30, 2005, at 167-1 (reporting that the agreement between the
government and KPMG obliges the firm to place “permanent restrictions on [its] tax
practice, including the termination of two practice areas: providing tax advice to
wealthy individuals, and KPMG’s compensation and benefits tax practice,” and
noting that the agreement requires “permanent adherence to higher tax practice
standards regarding the issuance of some tax opinions and the preparation of tax
returns”).
9. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 843 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding
that tax shelter investors commenced malpractice action against an attorney whose
opinion letter was used by tax shelter promoters to evidence a transaction’s supposed
legitimacy); Newmyer v. Philatelic Leasing, Ltd., 888 F.2d 385, 387 (6th Cir. 1989)
(finding that failed tax shelter investor commenced malpractice action against
promoter); Alpert v. Shafer, No. 89 Civ. 0839, 1991 WL 222130, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
24, 1991) (explaining that taxpayers sued accountant, claiming malpractice for
involving them in eight failed tax shelters).
10. The difference between pre– and post–1986 Act tax shelter malpractice cases
may, in part, be due to the changed nature of the tax shelter industry. See BERNARD
WOLFMAN ET AL., STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE § 208.1, at 139 (6th ed. 2004). In
detailing the differences between earlier individual tax shelters and the present-day
corporate tax shelter, Wolfman notes that

the tax shelters of the 1970s and 1980s were largely based on the use of
tax preferences (e.g., ACRS, tax credits and the like) to create
noneconomic losses. . . . In contrast, many of today’s tax shelters . . .
instead rely on exploitation of a technical defect in a Code or Regulation
provision to create a tax benefit that arguably was not intended (or at
least not contemplated) by Congress.
Id. Thus, in the 1970s and 1980s, taxpayers and tax practitioners were more like
co-conspirators in trying to exploit tax preferences. When the IRS invalidated
these shelters, taxpayers and practitioners were equally culpable, and, thus, few
malpractice cases ensued. In contrast, the more recent vintage of tax shelters
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financial recoveries involved in the recent cases were stunning, often
11
in the multimillion dollar range. Moreover, the defendants involved
in these cases were not two-bit promoters from the underbelly of the
legal, accounting, and banking professions; instead, they were
partners and managers at white-shoe law firms, accounting firms, and
12
financial institutions. And unlike tax shelter malpractice cases
involving the application of pre–1986 Act law, the recent wave of
professional malpractice cases attracted considerable public attention
13
and generated feature stories in the national media.
Though tax shelters employ diverse methods and devices to shelter
14
income from taxation, malpractice cases involving abusive shelters
share a similar factual underpinning. At the risk of oversimplifying,
tax shelter investors in the 1990s and early 2000s experienced large
taxable gains attributable to the sale or disposition of business
15
On the advice of their attorneys and
enterprises or securities.
were highly technical and complex in nature, forcing the taxpayer to rely entirely on
the practitioner’s expertise. When the IRS invalidated these shelters, investor
taxpayers were more apt to hold the practitioner responsible, and, thus, numerous
malpractice lawsuits developed.
11. See Simon v. KPMG LLP, No. 05-CV-3189, 2006 WL 1541048, at *12 (D.N.J.
June 2, 2006) (granting approval to $178 million plaintiff settlement agreement to
be paid by KPMG and the law firm of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood); Ling v. Cantley
& Sedacca, L.L.P., No. 04 Civ. 4566, 2006 WL 290477, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2006)
(stating that settlement fund paid by defendants equaled $4.599 million); Denney v.
Jenkens & Gilchrist, 230 F.R.D. 317, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (referring to amended
settlement agreement of $81,557,805 to be awarded to participating class action
plaintiffs plus an agreement by the malpractice insurance carriers to set aside
another $24,942,195 for those aggrieved taxpayers who did not participate in the
class action).
12. See Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2007) (involving the
accounting firm KPMG); Palmer Ventures LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, 254 F. App’x
426 (5th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (involving the financial institution Deutsche
Bank); Olson v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 461 F. Supp. 2d 710 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (involving
the law firm Jenkens & Gilchrist). One tax shelter promoter, Diversified Group, Inc.,
worked with many of the nation’s top law firms, including David Polk & Wardwell;
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; Piper Rudnick; and Mintz, Levin, Cohn,
Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo. See Paul Braverman, Helter Shelter, AM. LAW., Dec. 2003, at
65, 65 (examining the role of a tax partner who sold hundreds of tax shelters, at least
one of which resulted in a malpractice claim).
13. See, e.g., Cassell Bryan-Low, Accounting Firms Face Backlash over the Tax Shelters
They Sold, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2003, at A1; Johnston, supra note 1; Frontline: Tax Me If
You Can (PBS television broadcast Feb. 19, 2004) (investigating the abusive tax
shelter epidemic); 60 Minutes: Gimme Shelter (CBS television broadcast Oct. 19, 2003)
(discussing the effects of abusive tax shelters and the case of one taxpayer facing
liability after advisement from E&Y).
14. The tax shelter devices are as diverse as the tax shelter vernacular: BLIPS
(“Bond Linked Issue Premium Structure”), BOSS (“Bond and Option Sales
Strategy”) and Son of BOSS, CDS (“Contingent Deferred Swap”), FLIP (“Foreign
Leveraged Investment Program”), OPIS (“Offshore Portfolio Investment Strategy”),
and SC2 (“S-Corporation Charitable Contribution Strategy”).
15. Relative to middle- and low-income taxpayers, high-income taxpayers have a
greater financial incentive to participate in tax shelters. A deductible tax loss for a
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accountants, these taxpayers invested in tax-planning strategies that
generated huge tax losses to offset sizable taxable gains without any
16
The nation’s leading legal and
significant economic risk.
accounting professionals endorsed these transactions and propped
them up with legal opinions, thereby creating an air of legitimacy
17
around them. Comforted by the trappings of lawfulness, taxpayers
jumped at the opportunity to reduce their taxes, paying considerable
18
fees in the process.
As the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) learned of these
techniques, it categorized them as “listed transactions” and
19
disallowed punitive losses associated with their use. Many lawyers
and accountants scoffed at these IRS notices and their supposed
application to the tax shelters in question. In some instances, these
professionals did not immediately inform taxpayer clients of the IRS’s
20
position. In other instances, they made disclosure but insisted that

taxpayer subject to the 35% marginal tax rate yields $35 for every $100 of loss, for
example, compared to $15 for a taxpayer subject to the 15% marginal tax rate. In
the 1990s and 2000s, tax shelter promoters focused their energies on these highincome taxpayers. See Jacoboni v. KPMG LLP, 314 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (M.D. Fla.
2004) (finding that after lucrative deal closed resulting in significant capital gains for
taxpayer, taxpayer’s investment banker referred taxpayer to KPMG for tax shelter
products).
16. See id. (revealing that KPMG advised the taxpayer to enter into a certain
investment strategy, which later led to the taxpayer facing $28 million in federal
income tax capital gains liability).
17. See id. (recounting allegations that KMPG represented its tax shelter strategy
as a “no-lose” proposition).
18. See id. (noting that the plaintiff faced $28 million in federal income tax
capital gains liability after following the advice of KPMG).
19. Listed transactions are those transactions that the IRS believes warrant
heightened scrutiny. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (as amended in 2007). Once a
transaction is listed, a series of procedural rules take effect: taxpayers need to
disclose their participation in these listed transactions as prescribed in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6011-4 (as amended in 2007), and promoters (or other people responsible for
registering tax shelter transactions) need to register these transactions under Treas.
Reg. § 301.6111-2 (2003). In addition, material advisers must maintain lists of
investors and other information with respect to these listed transactions, pursuant to
Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1 (as amended in 2007). By way of illustration, the IRS
specifically “listed” those tax shelters that tax practitioners were using to negate
taxpayers’ capital gains. See I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255 (denying losses
associated with partnerships designed to provide taxpayers with artificially inflated
bases in their investments to produce artificial losses).
20. See Wilson v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 05 C 3474, 2005 WL 3299366, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2005) (“Plaintiffs contend that defendants should have informed
them of IRS Notices 1999-59 and 2000-44, which challenged the strategy and were
issued before plaintiffs entered the Strategy.”); Heller v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 04CV-3571, 2005 WL 525401, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2005) (noting that despite
defendants’ knowledge of two IRS notices that “informed tax [professionals] . . . of
the illegality of strategies such as the . . . purchase of digital options on foreign
currency, Defendants allegedly . . . continued to aggressively market and sell the
strategy as a legitimate tax shelter”).
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the nature of the purchased tax shelter was distinguishable from
21
those shelters described in the IRS notices.
At this point, investor taxpayers faced a choice: they could either
concede the invalidity of the transaction for which they had paid
sizable fees—and pay taxes owed, interest, and penalties—or fight the
IRS challenge, which would involve expensive, protracted litigation
22
with an uncertain outcome and the prospect of higher penalties.
The vast majority of investor taxpayers opted to cut their losses, forgo
the reported tax savings, and remit back taxes and interest. These
concessions, however, did not prevent investor taxpayers from
targeting the professionals who peddled the invalidated tax-planning
strategies. Investor taxpayers had paid for what they had been led to
believe was sound legal and accounting advice; in reality, they were
duped into buying tax shelters that, from the very beginning, stood
little chance of withstanding administrative or judicial scrutiny.
Prepared for long and expensive legal battles, and represented by
highly skilled litigators, these taxpayers, seeking retribution,
commenced civil malpractice cases against their former legal,
23
accounting, and financial advisers.
These cases did not involve the traditional battle lines, with
taxpayers aligned on one side and the government aligned on the
other. Rather, these battles involved taxpayers and the government
aligning on the same side, protecting tax revenues and the integrity
of the tax laws (albeit taxpayers fought this battle more as reluctant
mercenaries rather than as eager soldiers). On the other side stood
the tax practitioners who had created, marketed, and advised the
taxpayers on tax shelter use. The convergence of interests between
taxpayers and the government produced significant benefits for both:
at the micro-level, taxpayers reaped huge financial rewards and the
21. See RA Invs. I, LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 3:04-CV-1565-G, 2005 WL
1356446, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2005) (asserting that although some of the opinion
letters mentioned Notice 2000-44, these letters stated that it would have “‘no
substantive effect on the Transaction into which you entered’ and ‘is prima facie
inapplicable to your situation’”).
22. If the invalidated transaction was part of an amnesty or settlement program,
the taxpayer could avoid penalties or pay them at a reduced rate. See I.R.S.
Announcement 2005-80, 2005-46 I.R.B. 967–71 (providing that taxpayers who settled
had to pay 100% of taxes owed, interest, and, depending on the transaction, either
one-quarter or one-half of the penalty the IRS otherwise would seek). The majority
of listed transactions, however, were not subject to amnesty. Thus, taxpayers wishing
to concede the position to the government had to pay penalties as well as back taxes
and interest.
23. See, e.g., Jacoboni v. KPMG LLP, 314 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (M.D. Fla. 2004)
(detailing taxpayer’s civil suit against KPMG after taxpayer incurred approximately
$28 million in tax liability as a result of following KPMG’s investment strategy
advice).
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psychological fulfillment of obtaining justice; at the macro-level, the
government emerged with a stronger tax compliance ethos in place
as many rogue practitioners and firms financially stumbled or fell
(and compliant practitioners and firms took note of these
24
misfortunes).
Part I of this Article identifies the compliance-reinforcing
characteristics of the tax shelter malpractice experience. Informed
by a detailed examination of every published federal and state tax
shelter malpractice case involving post–1986 Act law, it demonstrates
how these disputes (1) leveled the litigation playing field; (2) aligned
the interests of taxpayers, compliant tax practitioners, and the
government on the side of tax collection rather than tax avoidance;
(3) punished tax shelter lawyers and accountants with traditional
sanctions in the form of monetary penalties; (4) further punished tax
shelter lawyers and accountants with alternative sanctions in the form
of shame and reputational humiliation; and (5) revealed that judges,
juries, and arbitrators would hold tax professionals to ethical and
practice guidelines.
Based upon the tax shelter malpractice experience, Part II
discusses five important “lessons” for the existing tax compliance
regime. In particular, it argues that successful tax enforcement
requires (1) resource and information symmetries, (2) incentives for
taxpayers and tax practitioners to choose compliance over avoidance,
(3) enhancement of traditional sanctions, (4) enhancement of
nontraditional sanctions, and (5) elevated ethical standards that are
enforced.
The final part of this Article, Part III, offers recommendations for
facilitating tax shelter malpractice litigation and reinforcing the
above lessons. Despite the demonstrated benefits of these cases,
plaintiff taxpayers face severe procedural roadblocks that favor
defendant practitioners. Thus, when prevailing in these cases,
plaintiff taxpayers should be afforded larger monetary recoveries,
and practitioners should be subject to significantly greater economic
exposure and to bad publicity for enabling abusive tax shelter activity.
I.

VIRTUES OF TAX SHELTER MALPRACTICE LITIGATION

Existing case law fails to depict the entire malpractice litigation
story. This is because there is not a single reported decision
24. See, e.g., I.R.S. News Release IR-2007-71 (Mar. 29, 2007), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-07-071.pdf (discussing the closure of the law
firm Jenkens & Gilchrist after it faced a $76 million penalty for fraudulent tax
shelters and noting that this should be a lesson to all tax professionals).
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determining whether a particular defendant committed
25
malpractice. Nevertheless, the reported cases, which include not
26
only cases brought by individuals but also class action lawsuits,
encompass a variety of motions, most of which were resolved in favor
of plaintiffs. The motions varied in nature. Some dealt with the
27
claims that were allowed to proceed. Others considered whether
28
there was a federal or state cause of action.
And still others
29
investigated whether a claim was ripe or if the statute of limitations
30
had lapsed. Although defendant practitioners won some motions,
31
particularly actions to compel arbitration, they resoundingly lost on
substantive issues, particularly with respect to the legitimacy of

25. Whether a plaintiff can successfully bring a civil malpractice case depends
upon several factors. Critical is a plaintiff’s ability to prove that the defendant
committed a tort or breached a contract. See RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH,
LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8.1 (6th ed. 2007) (stating that the foundations of civil
malpractice cases are based upon either traditional tort or contract theories of
recovery).
Despite technical differences, both theories in practice require
professionals to exercise reasonable competence and diligence under the
circumstances or risk malpractice exposure. For a prima facie tort-based cause of
action (i.e., negligence), a plaintiff must show four elements: (1) a duty owed by the
professional to the plaintiff, (2) breach of the duty, (3) injuries suffered by the
plaintiff, and (4) proximate cause between the injury suffered and the breach of
duty. Id. § 8.13. Likewise, for a prima facie contract-based cause of action, a plaintiff
must show the existence of four elements: (1) the existence of a contractual
relationship, (2) performance by the plaintiff, (3) breach of the contract by the
defendant, and (4) damages to the plaintiff as a result of the breach. Id. § 8.6.
26. At least three class action malpractice cases were of significance. See Denney
v. BDO Seidman, L.L.P., 412 F.3d 58, 68 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that tax shelter
services were within the scope of the consulting agreement and its arbitration
clause); Simon v. KPMG LLP, No. 05-CV-3189, 2006 WL 1541048, at *12 (D.N.J. June
2, 2006) (approving a settlement agreement reached by defendants and plaintiff
class of taxpayers after defendants allegedly defrauded plaintiffs); Ling v. Cantley &
Sedacca, L.L.P., No. 04 Civ. 4566, 2006 WL 290477, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2006)
(awarding reasonable attorney fees and expenses in class action lawsuit).
27. See Amato v. KPMG LLP, 433 F. Supp. 2d 460, 463–64 (M.D. Pa. 2006)
(ordering plaintiffs to submit claims to arbitration and staying the further
proceedings until the completion of arbitration).
28. See Hoehn Family, LLC v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, No. 07-0069-CV,
2007 WL 1028768, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 30, 2007) (remanding case after concluding
that plaintiff’s allegations did not fall within the narrow category of state claims that
arise under federal law).
29. See Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 363, 371 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (finding that because damages to plaintiffs were “immediate and definite,”
plaintiffs’ claims were ripe).
30. See, e.g., Seippel v. Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood, L.L.P., 399 F. Supp. 2d 283,
289 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that plaintiffs’ securities fraud claim was not timebarred because the Sarbanes-Oxley Act extended the statute of limitations for such
claims to the earlier of either five years from the violation or two years from the time
of discovery).
31. See Olson v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 461 F. Supp. 2d 710, 730 (N.D. Ill. 2006)
(granting defendants’ motion to compel arbitration after finding that plaintiffs
signed retainer agreements that contained an arbitration clause).
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32

These losses put defendant
pending malpractice claims.
practitioners on the defensive and set the tone for subsequent
settlement discussions. They also surely impacted judges’, jurors’,
and arbitrators’ decisions as they considered the fate of the parties
against the backdrop of these unfavorable motion decisions for
defendants. And while there is a lack of direct access to settlement,
jury, and arbitration outcomes, the available evidence and repeated
references to settlement amounts suggest that plaintiffs prevailed in
33
the majority of these cases, whether in front of a judge, jury, or
arbitrator.
The losses that defendants experienced did not just happen by
accident.
The unique exigencies placed upon defendant
practitioners involved in tax shelter malpractice cases make
malpractice suits powerful weapons in the fight against tax avoidance
and especially against abusive tax shelters. These complianceboosting results were made possible by the many virtues of tax shelter
litigation, which include (1) leveling the litigation playing field,
(2) aligning the interests of taxpayers and tax practitioners with those
of tax officials, (3) punishing wayward practitioners with financial
penalties, (4) offering alternative sanctions such as shaming and
reputational humiliation, and (5) breathing life into ethical
standards that might otherwise remain largely fallow. These virtues
make tax shelter malpractice litigation a useful mechanism in the
face of tax avoidance and the gross misuse of tax shelters.

32. See Williams v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, L.L.P., 832 N.Y.S.2d 9, 11–12
(App. Div. 2007) (finding that plaintiffs’ claims, including claims of fraud and breach
of the implied covenant of good faith, were sufficiently stated); see also infra
Appendix (providing a complete and comprehensive survey of the nature of the
motions and their outcomes).
33. See Simon v. KPMG LLP, No. 05-CV-3189, 2006 WL 1541048, at *3 (D.N.J.
June 2, 2006) (detailing a proposed settlement that provides for a total recovery for
the class of $153,920,847.60, including certain administrative and related expenses of
the settlement, plus an additional fund of $24,624,750.00 for any award of attorney
fees and the reimbursement of the plaintiffs’ counsel’s costs and expenses, in
exchange for release of the class’s claims concerning or relating to tax strategies);
Ling v. Cantley & Sedacca, L.L.P., No. 04 Civ.4566, 2006 WL 290477, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 8, 2006) (stating that the final settlement established a settlement fund of
$4.599 million to resolve the class’s damage claims); Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist,
230 F.R.D. 317, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that the mediated settlement agreement
created a $75 million fund that consisted of $63.5 million from the insurance
carriers, $5.25 million from Jenkens, and $6.25 million from the individual
defendants).
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A. Leveling the Litigation Playing Field
On the normal litigation playing field, the IRS is at an inherent
34
disadvantage. Not only must it process millions of returns, but it
35
must do so without sufficient money, personnel, or expertise. What
makes the government’s job even more difficult is that abusive tax
shelters involve arrangements that are often opaque, complex, and
36
difficult to detect.
In those rare instances when taxpayers’
aggressive tax positions are in fact detected, the IRS faces additional
difficulties in prosecuting the matter. Relative to taxpayers, the IRS
must conduct its litigation efforts staffed with fewer, less experienced
attorneys and limited funding allocations for each case, which results
in fewer expert witnesses for the government and fewer depositions
37
of defendant parties.
Furthermore, taxpayers possess all the
information that the government needs, including transaction
memoranda, accounting computations, accrual work papers, and
opinion letters. The IRS struggles to obtain all of this information
through the discovery process while fighting against the often
38
39
impenetrable attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine.
34. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK, 2007, at 4
tbl.2 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/07databk.pdf (indicating
that the IRS processed more than 183 million income tax returns in 2007); Michael
Graetz, Taxes That Work: A Simple American Plan 1046 (2006) (“The IRS routinely
processes more than 130 million individual and corporate income tax returns and
nearly 1.5 billion information documents each year.”).
35. See IRS OVERSIGHT BD., ANNUAL REPORT 2007, at 9 (2008), available at
http://www.treas.gov/irsob/reports/2008/IRSOB_Annual-Report_2007.pdf
(“[W]hen its budget is adjusted for inflation, the IRS has received fewer resources
compared to FY2002 and its workforce has shrunk by almost 15,000 employees.”); see
also David Cay Johnston, Corporate Risk of Tax Audit Is Still Shrinking, I.R.S. Data Show,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2004, at C1 (stating that for companies with more than $250
million in assets, the audit rate fell from 33.7% in 2002 to 29% in 2003).
36. See Marvin Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a
Silver Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1942 (2005) (“Tax shelter arrangements are
inevitably complex and detailed—often by design.”).
37. See GRAETZ, supra note 34, at 1046 (stating that the IRS is “supposed to issue
regulations promptly implementing frequent and massive legislative changes, to
ferret out and deter income-tax protestors and corporate tax shelters, to halt tax
evasion, and to bring the underground economy to the surface. The IRS cannot do
all of these things well. Many it cannot do at all.”); Nina E. Olson, Olson Testifies on
Fairness in IRS Enforcement, 2007 TAX NOTES TODAY 44-28 (explaining that the IRS
“does not have the resources to pursue a significant percentage of its accounts
receivable” and that “the private debt collection initiative, a controversial program
that is projected to raise only about $1.4 billion over the next 10 years, results from
the IRS’s lack of resources to pursue these cases itself”).
38. See United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 815 (7th Cir. 2007)
(exploring the broad scope of the attorney-client privilege). See generally Linda M.
Beale, Tax Advice Before the Return: The Case for Raising Standards and Denying
Evidentiary Privileges, 25 VA. TAX REV. 583 (2006) (arguing that the best way to stop
socially wasteful tax planning is to accelerate a paradigm shift in the area of tax
compliance); Richard Lavoie, Making a List and Checking It Twice: Must a Tax Attorney
Divulge Who’s Naughty and Nice?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 141 (2004) (analyzing tax
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The gaping resource and information disparities result in a taxavoidance playing field that is heavily stacked against the IRS.
The circumstances surrounding the tax shelter malpractice cases,
however, level the playing field. This level playing field involves
several key features: both sides sported attorneys equal in skill and
expertise, both sides possessed more than adequate financial
resources, and both sides had equal access to information. Each of
these key features is discussed in turn below.
The attorneys representing each side of the litigation possessed a
similar skill level and expertise. Given their networking circles and
economic wherewithal, tax shelter investors tapped into the nation’s
best and brightest plaintiff attorneys. Consider the backgrounds of
two such lawyers, David Deary and W. Ralph Canada, Jr. Though
their pedigrees are impressive (with Deary graduating from the
University of Texas Law School and Canada graduating from Harvard
Law School), their experience with sophisticated tax shelter
transactions and litigation is beyond impressive. Together, Deary and
Canada handled some of the most important and high-profile tax
40
As would be
shelter malpractice cases of the last ten years.
expected, defendant practitioners—themselves members of the
nation’s leading law, accounting, and banking firms—brought their
attorneys’ ability to protect a client’s identity from the IRS under the attorney-client
privilege); Shane Jasmine Young, Pierce the Privilege or Give ‘Em Shelter? The Applicability
of Privilege in Tax Shelter Cases, 5 NEV. L.J. 767 (2005) (arguing that both the tax
practitioner privilege and the identity privilege should be abolished in tax shelter
cases); Angela Ahern, Note, Are Tax Shelter Clients’ Identities Protected by Section 7525
Privilege or Left Out in the Cold? United States v. BDO Seidman, 57 TAX LAW. 779
(2004) (examining the Seventh Circuit’s application of the tax practitioner-client
privilege under section 7525); Sheryl Stratton, BDO Seidman Court Breathes Life into
Accountant-Client Privilege, 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 64-2 (addressing the implications
of a district court’s holding that the section 7525 privilege, the attorney-client
privilege, and the work-product doctrine protected 266 of 267 documents from IRS
scrutiny in BDO v. Seidman, LLP); Sheryl Stratton, BDO Court Rules Attorney-Client
Privilege Applies in Shelter Context, 2004 TAX NOTES TODAY 129-1 (examining United
States v. BDO Seidman, LLP and its potential damaging effect on the government’s
argument that the crime-fraud exception applies in communications between
accounting firms and law firms).
39. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981) (holding that
under the work-product doctrine, an IRS summons is ineffectual to obtain
documents prepared by an attorney conducting an investigation of questionable
payments to foreign governments); MINORITY STAFF OF PERM. SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY: THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTANTS, LAWYERS
AND FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS, FOUR KPMG CASE STUDIES: FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS AND
SC2, S. REP. NO. 108-34, at 14 (2003) (“Still another tactic discussed in several KPMG
documents was explicitly using attorney-client or other legal privileges to limit
disclosure of KPMG documents.”).
40. Both attorneys worked together in over thirty federal and state tax shelter
malpractice cases, including the following two huge class action cases: Denney v.
Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2006), and Hudson v. Deutsche Bank AG,
No. 05 C 6783, 2007 WL 1018137 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2007).
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41

own heavy hitters to the tax shelter malpractice cases. However,
unlike in their typical dealings with the government, these litigators
42
faced equals on the playing field.
Second, each side of the dispute—plaintiff taxpayers and
43
defendant practitioners—had access to identical resources.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys recognized the apparent merit of these tax
shelter malpractice cases and were willing to make a significant
economic commitment to see them through to the end. In Denney v.
44
Jenkens & Gilchrist, a class action case, for example, five plaintiff law
firms spent close to 20,000 billable hours analyzing each element of
the shelter transaction, preparing and deposing witnesses, and
45
examining thousands of documents. Experts also had to be called,
including valuation experts, forensic accountants, and tax attorneys,
46
each of whom billed at rates anywhere from $300 to $1000 per hour.
At each step along the way, plaintiffs’ counsel countered defense
counsel and used whatever maneuvers, at whatever cost, to secure
victory (e.g., rather than just rely on the expertise of a single tax
expert to identify the flaws of a particular tax shelter transaction,
plaintiffs’ counsel often called upon former attorneys at the U.S.
41. Lawrence M. Hill and Seth C. Farber, both from the elite law firm of Dewey &
LeBoeuf LLP, for example, represented Deutsche Bank in numerous tax shelter
malpractice litigations. See, e.g., In re Watson, No. 1:05-cv-1117, 2006 WL 1566968
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2006); Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 412 F. Supp. 2d 293
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); Cantwell v. Deutsche Bank, Inc., No. 305CV1378-D, 2005 WL
2296049 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2005). Hill and Farber graduated from George
Washington Law School and Harvard Law School, respectively.
42. Admittedly, the highly skilled members of the private tax bar who litigated on
the plaintiff taxpayers’ behalf were not necessarily drawn to the controversy by
altruistic reasons of arguing on behalf of the internal revenue laws but by the
prospect of multi-million dollar contingency fees. See, e.g., Ling v. Cantley & Sedacca,
L.L.P., No. 04 Civ. 4566, 2006 WL 290477, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2006) (awarding
attorneys 17% of overall recovery, or $781,830, plus $77,782.50 for costs and
expenses in a tax shelter malpractice case); Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 230 F.R.D.
317 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (explaining that the total award for attorney fees and expenses
was $12,610,449.84, representing approximately 15.5% of the total settlement fund).
43. See Geoffrey W. Heineman, Tax Shelters and the Exposure to Professionals, INS.
ADVISORY (Ohrenstein & Brown, LLP, New York, N.Y.), Oct. 5, 2004, at 3, available at
http://www.oandb.com/attachment.html/articles/307/927+PDF+for+Bolger.pdf
(explaining how high-income taxpayers who had made tax shelter investments had
the economic wherewithal to pursue malpractice claims to completion).
44. 230 F.R.D. 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
45. Id. at 351–52.
46. In 2007, I was called to be an expert witness in three tax shelter malpractice
cases—Plyler v. BDO Seidman, L.L.P., No. 042146, 2004 WL 5039849 (W.D. Tenn. Dec.
29, 2004) (case now settled); Stechler v. Sidley, Austin Brown & Wood, L.L.P, 382 F.
Supp. 2d 580 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (case currently pending); and Maletis v. Perkins &
Company, No. CV-05-820-ST, 2005 WL 3021254 (D. Ore. Sept. 13, 2005) (case
currently pending). When I requested $350 per hour, I was told that while I was not
the least expensive expert witness, I “came relatively cheaply” because other experts
asked for up to $1000 per hour.
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Department of Justice to further amplify a shelter’s egregious
nature). Both sides of the controversy understood that financial
stinginess at any point during the dispute was short-sighted and could
possibly result in either forfeiture of massive recoveries or generation
of greater future costs.
Third, and perhaps most important, neither side of the dispute
suffered from information deficiencies. Unlike typical tax disputes
with the taxpayer possessing all of the relevant information sought by
the government, both sides of the controversy in the case of tax
shelter malpractice litigation possessed access to the same
information. As former clients of the defendant practitioners,
plaintiff taxpayers had control over the information that their legal
representatives might withhold in a dispute with the government. In
particular, plaintiff taxpayers were not thwarted by claims of attorneyclient privilege because they were the holders of the privilege and
therefore could deliver documents or evidence pertaining to tax
shelter investment materials, such as opinion letters, investment
47
guidelines, and tax return preparation instructions. Nor were they
thwarted by defendant practitioners’ efforts to seek work-product
protection because the plaintiff taxpayers already possessed or could
obtain all documents prepared by the defendant practitioners in the
48
course of prior representation.
With a level litigation playing field, the merits of each case could be
clearly and fairly heard. Moreover, a judge, jury, or arbitrator could
render judgment with all the relevant information disclosed and in

47. Information disclosure was not universally the case. For example, according
to congressional investigation of the tax shelter market, “KPMG required some
potential purchasers of the tax products to sign ‘nondisclosure agreements’ and
severely limited the paperwork used to explain the tax products.” MINORITY STAFF OF
PERM. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY: THE ROLE OF
ACCOUNTANTS, LAWYERS AND FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS, FOUR KPMG CASE STUDIES:
FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS AND SC2, S. REP. NO. 108-34, at 14 (2003).
48. By way of comparison, information asymmetries did not plague plaintiff
taxpayers in the tax shelter malpractice litigation as much as such deficiencies
plagued the government in its civil and criminal tax prosecutions of abusive tax
shelter behavior. See United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 815–16 (7th
Cir. 2007) (utilizing the attorney-client privilege successfully on behalf of tax
practitioner client to preclude the government’s access to a certain critical legal
memorandum); United States v. Roxworthy, 457 F.3d 590, 591 (6th Cir. 2006)
(reversing a district court order requiring disclosure of two memoranda prepared by
KPMG under the work-product doctrine); United States v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807,
810 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding that the attorney-client privilege precludes the IRS from
getting ready access to list of clients who invested in tax shelters); United States v.
Textron, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 154 (D.R.I. 2007) (asserting that taxpayer’s tax
accrual work papers were protected under the work-product doctrine).
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the open. On a level playing field, plaintiff taxpayers prevailed
49
against defendant practitioners in a clear majority of the cases.
B. Aligning the Interests of Taxpayers, Tax Practitioners, and Tax Officials
Historically, taxpayers and tax practitioners have viewed the tax
system as an us-versus-them proposition. Taxpayers and their tax
advisers have felt that they could do just about anything within legal
bounds to minimize their tax obligations. And, in fact, taxpayers do
not have a legal responsibility to pay more in taxes than they owe.
“Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as
50
possible,” Judge Learned Hand wrote in 1934. Moreover, as the
U.S. Supreme Court opined just one year later, “The legal right of a
taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his
taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits,
51
cannot be doubted.” Armed with this authority, tax practitioners
over the years have approached taxpaying and tax advising as a zerosum gain in which practitioners and their clients lose whenever the
government wins. In other words, tax advising and tax compliance
are adversarial processes.
This Article does not address the merits or demerits of this
adversarial approach, a debate that commentators have fully
52
addressed elsewhere. Rather, using the tax shelter malpractice cases
as illustrative, it demonstrates that this adversarial paradigm can be
challenged and, ultimately, overcome. Indeed, the tax shelter
malpractice experience demonstrates that with the right incentives,
particularly those that are monetary in nature, taxpayers and their
counsel can be induced to promote rather than undermine tax
compliance.

49. The Appendix indicates that plaintiff taxpayers won the vast majority of
motions. By winning these motions, it is fair to assume that plaintiff taxpayers had
the upper hand in subsequent litigation, settlement, and arbitration decisions.
50. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465
(1935).
51. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935) (citations omitted). See
Comm’r v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850–51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting)
(“Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging
one’s affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor; and
all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands:
taxes are enforced extractions, not voluntary contributions.”).
52. See generally Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008) (examining several options available to the government in
regulating tax shelters and articulating an approach to tax regulation based on
cooperation, information sharing, and interest convergence).
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Consider the fact that investor taxpayers in recent years lost
53
millions of dollars in failed tax shelter investments. As a result of
these losses, taxpayers sought financial restitution, even if that meant
putting their personal and financial information, as well as their tax
54
shenanigans, into the public realm.
Plaintiffs’ counsel, for their
part, perceived considerable financial gain associated with assisting
plaintiff taxpayers. Both groups thus aligned their interests with
55
those of the government; that is, both groups decided to pursue the
rogue practitioners that created, marketed, and enabled abusive tax
shelters.
In addition to monetary incentives, these plaintiff taxpayers
possessed a motivating sense of betrayal. They had entrusted their
financial affairs to the lawyers and accountants who had sold them
the tax shelter investments. Furthermore, they had paid these
56
advisers considerable fees for their services.
Once the IRS
challenged these tax shelter transactions, however, the investor
taxpayers learned that they had been duped in ways that were

53. See, e.g., Conwill, IV v. Arthur Andersen LLP, No. 602023/05, slip op. at 7
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 21, 2006) (concluding that plaintiffs, as a result of entering into a
settlement with the IRS, “were required to pay over $3,842,385 in taxes, $521,824.01
in interest, and $436,255 in penalties”).
54. See Curtis Inv. Co. v. Bayerische Hypo-Und Vereinsbank, AG, No. 1:06-cv2752, 2007 WL 4564133, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 20, 2007) (noting that plaintiff
“realized a $29 million capital gain from the sale of highly appreciated securities”);
Alfano v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 925 A.2d 22, 24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007)
(stating plaintiff was allegedly solicited to invest in a tax strategy to shelter
$150 million in capital gains that he realized from the sale of his business).
55. Far from being idle, the government has vigorously pursued actions against
aggressive tax promoters. For example, the Justice Department has brought several
criminal indictments against aggressive tax planners. See, e.g., Scott Antonides,
Defendant Pleads Guilty in KPMG Case, 2007 TAX NOTES TODAY 176-3 (reporting that
defendant in the tax shelter case involving KPMG pleaded guilty to conspiracy,
admitting to a role in selling shelters that helped clients evade an estimated
$2.5 billion in taxes); Carolyn Wright LaFon, Former KPMG Partner Indicted for
Defrauding the IRS with U.S., Foreign Tax Shelter, 2008 TAX NOTES TODAY 56-6 (stating
that former KPMG partner, Michael Pfaff, was indicted on “charges of arranging the
participation of various entities and individuals in tax shelter transactions occurring
both domestically and outside the United States that resulted in millions of dollars of
fee income being concealed from the IRS and Treasury”).
56. See, e.g., Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 758 (9th Cir. 2007) (“According
to the complaint, the BLIPS transactions had been devised by KPMG and B & W as a
means of charging unwarranted and excessive fees to a ‘“select audience” of
individuals who had sold large businesses or otherwise incurred large capital
gains.’”); Ducote Jax Holdings, L.L.C. v. Bradley, No. 04-1943, 2006 WL 3313716, at
*1 (E.D. La. Nov. 14, 2006) (“The Plaintiffs claim that the advice from the
Defendants has proven disastrous in that they have paid a significant amount of fees
to the Defendants only to receive allegedly erroneous and incompetent advice. . . .”);
Jacoboni v. KPMG LLP, 314 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (stating that
defendants were paid “substantial fees” for their work).
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57

Thus, the investor
collusive, backhanded, and even fraudulent.
taxpayers viewed malpractice litigation as a way to teach their former
advisers a lesson, even if that lesson benefited the government’s long58
standing efforts to crack down on abusive tax-avoidance activity.
Just as tax shelter malpractice cases illustrate that taxpayers can
bolster tax compliance in the presence of proper incentives, tax
practitioners can align on the side of tax collection given proper
inducement. One such incentive involves practitioners’ desire to
avoid the anxiety, anguish, and agony of being the subject of a
59
malpractice suit.
These suits are time-consuming, resource60
intensive, humiliating, and potentially financially ruinous. Indeed,
the very existence and looming possibility of tax shelter malpractice
suits constituted one of the primary reasons that, in recent years, law
61
and accounting firms revamped internal rules and procedures.
Reconsidering internal controls and compliance procedures involved
57. See Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 758–59 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing
plaintiff’s allegations that defendants “were active participants in the conspiracy” and
“knew that the series of BLIPS transactions were predetermined steps to generate
sham losses for the purpose of obtaining tax benefits”); Jacoboni, 314 F. Supp. 2d at
1174 (finding that plaintiff “was not apprised of the significant tax risks” associated
with the tax shelter strategy marketed by KPMG and that KPMG represented as
“bullet proof”).
58. See LaFon, supra note 55.
59. See MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 25, § 24.27, at 675 (“Tax shelter advice and
activities have resulted in significant and frequent financial exposure.”); Robert
Feinschreiber & Margaret Kent, Tax Shelter Malpractice, 83 TAX NOTES 1037, 1038
(1999) (“Tax professionals may face increasing financial exposure.”). To the extent
that lawyers and accountants react to malpractice suits in ways similar to that of
physicians, they would avoid aggressive taxpayers as clients. See Sara C. Charles et al.,
Sued and Nonsued Physicians’ Self-Reported Reactions to Malpractice Litigation, 142 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 437, 440 (1985) (stating that many sued doctors avoid seeing certain
kinds of patients).
60. In the case of law firm Jenkens & Gilchrist, the financial havoc wreaked by
the latest wave of malpractice cases was so damaging that it forced the firm out of
business. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2007-71 (Mar. 29, 2007). Upon closure of the
firm, the IRS announced thus:
While it is unfortunate that the 56-year-old national firm of Jenkens &
Gilchrist is terminating its legal practice, this should be a lesson to all tax
professionals that they must not aid or abet tax evasion by clients or promote
potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters, or ignore their responsibilities to
register or disclose tax shelters.
Id.; see Lynnley Browning, Texas Law Firm Will Close and Settle Tax Shelter Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2007, at C3 (writing that Jenkens & Gilchrist, “only six years ago
among the largest, highest-earning law firms in the nation, becomes the latest
casualty in the government’s growing crackdown on aggressive tax shelters”).
61. See Anthony V. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise of Risk Management,
94 GEO. L. J. 1909, 1936–37 (2006) (discussing the rise of risk management in law
firms due, in part, to the rise of legal malpractice cases); William L. Tabac, Crossfire at
the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1987, § 6 (Mag.), at 30 (stating that James Vorenberg,
former dean of Harvard Law School, observed that legal malpractice cases serve an
important function of putting pressure on lawyers to maintain high professional
standards).
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aligning practice standards with those reflected in Treasury
Department regulations and statutory penalties, which, in turn,
62
reinforced rather than undermined the internal revenue laws.
Aside from malpractice avoidance, some practitioners also aligned
their interests with those of the government for an entirely different
reason—money. Fees ordinarily attract practitioners to save tax
dollars on behalf of taxpayers; in the case of abusive tax shelters, tax
practitioners took this tax savings mantra to extremes, suggesting that
they could miraculously produce legitimate losses that involved no
63
economic exposure. However, the opportunity to collect fees is a
carrot that knows no allegiance: just as it can lure practitioners to
attempt to save taxpayers tax dollars, it can also lure other
practitioners to litigate against purveyors of abusive tax shelters (thus
aligning their interests with those of the government) in aspirations
of collecting huge contingency fees. And this is exactly what
transpired in the case of tax shelter malpractice litigation as plaintiff
attorneys suspected that if they invested sufficient time and resources,
they would prevail in the courtroom and be handsomely rewarded for
64
their efforts. Plaintiff attorneys and the government thus shared a
common goal: to inflict as much financial hardship as possible upon
the purveyors of these abusive tax shelters.
With the right incentives, taxpayers and tax practitioners can thus
be motivated to align their interests with those of the government.
These incentives may take the form of sticks (e.g., the threat of
malpractice suits) or carrots (e.g., rich monetary awards). Together,
a mix of sticks and carrots can induce taxpayers and tax practitioners
to reinforce the government’s tax compliance efforts.
C. Punishing Wayward Practitioners with Traditional Sanctions:
Monetary Penalties
One of the most powerful and penetrating aspects of malpractice
litigation is the monetary punishment it inflicts upon wayward
practitioners. As a result of their involvement in the tax shelter
market, some of the nation’s most prestigious law and accounting
firms, as well as their members, endured hefty direct and indirect

62. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 230 F.R.D. 317, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(asserting that plaintiffs paid excessive fees for negligent tax advice).
64. See, e.g., Ling v. Cantley & Sedacca, L.L.P., No. 04 Civ. 4566, 2006 WL 290477,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2006) (awarding plaintiff attorneys $781,830 in fees and
$77,782.50 in expenses in tax shelter malpractice case).
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65

With respect to direct financial costs, defendant
financial costs.
firms and their members had to devote hours of time to develop
litigation strategies, give depositions, and testify in court and before
66
arbitration boards. These were wasted hours that otherwise could
have been spent on current client matters and the generation of
future business. Furthermore, although in some instances—when
these tax professionals and their firms lost malpractice cases in court
or through arbitration—their insurance carriers were required to
67
pick up the tab; in other instances, the tax professionals and their
firms were stuck holding the bill as settlement payouts exceeded the
68
insurance coverage.
In addition, these firms and their members experienced indirect
financial costs as well. Bad publicity hounded these firms and their
members, exacerbating the situation with additional financial
burdens. In general, law firms and accounting firms strive to achieve
pristine reputations. Indeed, the better a law or accounting firm’s
reputation, the easier it is to develop business and recruit talent to its
69
ranks. The malpractice cases cast a long shadow over firms peddling
65. From 2000 until June 20, 2008, there were sixteen reported federal and state
malpractice cases in which the accounting firm of KPMG was a named defendant,
eighteen such cases in which the law firm of Sidley Austin was a named defendant,
and twenty-four such cases in which the financial institution of Deutsche Bank was a
named defendant. See infra Appendix.
66. Consider the fact that in just over a five-year time span, the accounting firm
KPMG was a named defendant in twelve tax shelter malpractice cases: Swartz v.
KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2007); Amato v. KPMG LLP, 433 F. Supp. 2d 460
(M.D. Pa. 2006); Chew v. KPMG, LLP, 407 F. Supp. 2d 790 (S.D. Miss. 2006); Simon
v. KPMG LLP, No. 05-CV-3189, 2006 WL 1541048 (D.N.J. June 2, 2006); Abrams v.
KPMG, LLP, No. 05-CV-3745, 2006 WL 489504 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2006); Chew v.
KPMG, LLP, No. 3:04CV748BN, 2005 WL 5353281 (S.D. Miss. 2005); Shalam v.
KPMG, LLP, No. 05CV3602, 2005 WL 2139928 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005); Pecan E.
Antonio Investors, Inc. v. KPMG LLP, No. SA04CA0677FB, 2005 WL 2105751 (W.D.
Tex. Aug. 31, 2005); Galtney v. KPMG LLP, No. H05583, 2005 WL 1214613 (S.D.
Tex. May 19, 2005); Jacoboni v. KPMG LLP, 314 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (M.D. Fla. 2004);
Swartz v. KPMG, LLC, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (W.D. Wash. 2004); Loftin v. KPMG LLP,
2003 WL 22225621 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2003).
67. See, e.g., Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 230 F.R.D. 317, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(providing that in class action lawsuit, malpractice insurance carriers agreed to pay
$70,057,805 in claims plus an additional $24,942,195 for defendant law firm to
defend or resolve the claims of class action opt-outs).
68. See id. (noting that defendants who were individually named agreed to pay a
total of $6.25 million in damages and the firm agreed to pay $5.25 million); Paul
Braverman, The Tax Man’s Travails, AM. LAW., Apr. 2004, at 22 (reporting that Paul
Daugerdas will himself have to pay $4 million to help settle a lawsuit against Jenkens
& Gilchrist).
69. See, e.g., Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner’s Perspective on Substance, Form and
Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV.
47, 56 (2001) (“A practitioner’s reputation will provide credibility in dealing with
clients, opposing counsel, and the I.R.S. on audit and in connection with advance
rulings.”); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, Specialization, and
Medical Malpractice, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1069 (2006) (reporting that “when lawyers
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aggressive tax shelters and over their commitment to the profession,
thereby severely tarnishing reputations and damaging future business
70
prospects as well as recruitment opportunities.
Tax professionals and their firms were not the only parties to pay
for tax shelter involvement. Malpractice insurance carriers, in fact,
may have paid the steepest financial price for their insureds’
71
misdeeds. Though they tried, insurance carriers could not find
exculpatory language or excuses to assert that malpractice insurance
coverage did not extend to acts of providing abusive tax shelter
advice. As a result, these carriers were forced to pay out millions of
72
dollars in claims, causing some of them to reconfigure the scope
73
and protections afforded under their policies.
The tax shelter marketplace and subsequent malpractice litigation
hurt not only perpetrators, but innocent parties as well. For example,
in some instances, corporate taxpayers who never participated in
abusive tax shelter arrangements suffered falling share prices due to
74
their tax professionals’ involvement in abusive shelter activity. In
were asked in the Referral Survey how they chose to whom to refer the case, the most
important reason they gave, by far, is a lawyer’s reputation, followed by a lawyer’s
compatibility with the client”).
70. See Braverman, supra note 68, at 22 (“Competing firms have tried to use the
deluge of bad publicity [related to the tax shelter malpractice litigation] to poach
clients . . . .”); Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Reputation or Lower Taxes?, 2005
TAX NOTES TODAY 168-1 (“[T]he actions of the tax department can tarnish a
company’s public image.”).
71. See Braverman, supra note 68, at 22 (“The firm’s primary insurer, Executive
Risk Indemnity Inc., had previously disclaimed coverage for the litigation, arguing
that Jenkens had already drawn on its policy to settle an earlier tax shelter case, and
that the policy doesn’t cover reimbursement of clients for fines imposed by the
IRS.”).
72. See Denney, 230 F.R.D. at 324 (detailing the amounts Jenkens & Gilchrist’s
insurance provider had to pay).
73. See James M. Fischer, External Control over the American Bar, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 59, 66 (2006) (“[T]he precise limitations attached to coverage have a more
penetrating and a more directing impact on the actual practice of law by lawyers
than the professional codes. Increasingly the manner and method by which lawyers
practice law is determined by insurers’ requirements rather than professional
guidance.”). See generally George M. Cohen, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Loss
Prevention: A Comparative Analysis of Economic Institutions, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 305 (1997)
(surveying how the changes in the regulatory environment governing lawyering has
caused insurance companies to alter their policies).
74. Taxpayers who unwittingly retained legal and accounting professionals who
had helped orchestrate abusive tax shelters had to deal with the fallout from these
malpractice cases. Empirical studies indicate that the fair market value of stock
declines in value when the reputations of the professionals that the issuing firm
retains face ethical scrutiny. See generally William R. Baber, Krishna R. Kumar &
Thomas Verghese, Client Security Price Reactions to Laventhol and Horwath Bankruptcy, 33
J. ACCT. RES. 385 (1995) (providing statistical analysis of the negative impact of
Leventhol & Horwath’s bankruptcy on its clients stock returns); Paul K. Chancy &
Kirk L. Philipich, Shredded Reputation: The Cost of Audit Failure, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 40
(2002) (analyzing the impact of the Enron audit failure on the reputation of Arthur
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other instances, innocent tax professionals paid the price as
malpractice insurance carriers were forced to reconsider the scope of
attorney and accountant coverage as well as the structuring of the
75
premium base, a reconsideration that has led to steep rises in
76
premium costs and even curtailment of coverage.
In sum, malpractice litigation can inflict a broad range of financial
hardships upon both rogue and compliant tax professionals and their
firms. In addition to the traditional third-party penalties found in the
Internal Revenue Code (“Code”), designed to punish rogue
77
practitioners who peddle overly aggressive tax advice, practitioners
are subject to the financial consequences of lawsuits by plaintiff
78
taxpayers seeking retribution from the responsible tax professionals.
What practitioners have learned is that erstwhile clients who have met
with defeat at the hands of the IRS will likely turn around and sue
Andersen, Enron’s auditor, and the resulting negative impact on the stock prices of
Andersen’s clients); William A. Hillison & Carl Pacini, Auditor Reputation and the
Insurance Hypothesis: The Information Content of Disclosures of Financial Distress of a Major
Accounting Firm, 16 J. MANAGERIAL ISSUES 65 (2004) (studying the impact on share
price of litigation-bankruptcy related rumors of the client’s auditor); Krishnagopal
Menon & David D. Williams, The Insurance Hypothesis and Market Prices, 69 ACCT. REV.
327 (1994) (suggesting that the disclosure of the bankruptcy of the accounting firm
Leventhol & Horwath had an adverse effect on the market prices of the firm’s
clients); see also Julia L. Higgs et al., Taxing Audit Markets and Reputation: An
Examination of the Tax Shelter Controversy (Mar. 5, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=956053 (“We find evidence
consistent with past research that the market values the reputation of the auditor,
and when the auditor’s reputation is in question, investors downgrade both the
quality of the firm’s audits and the value of the insurance provided by the CPA firm
with a decline in the stock price.”).
75. In a practitioner newsletter, a major insurance advisory firm offered the
following detailed recommendation:
Appropriate protections to be included can, for instance, include larger selfinsured retentions, modification of the policy’s definition of Loss to protect
against fines and penalties that the IRS may assess against clients, which fines
and penalties the clients will turn to insureds for. To the extent the Insuring
Clause utilizes the term “Professional Services,” the definition of that term
can likewise be modified to exclude acts as an organizer or seller within the
scope of 26 CFR § 301.6112-1, or a material adviser, as defined in 26 U.S.C. §
6111 or 26 CFR § 301.6112-1. Finally, exclusionary language can be
specifically crafted to eliminate coverage for such abusive tax shelters.
Heineman, supra note 43, at 3.
76. See, e.g., Anthony Lin, Law Firm Malpractice Premiums on the Rise, N.Y. L.J., Mar.
18, 2003 (predicting much higher insurance premiums attributable, in part, to legal
malpractice cases); Richard Perez-Pena, When Lawyers Go After Their Peers: The Boom in
Malpractice Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1994, at A23 (“In 1970, lawyers were paying less
for malpractice insurance than for car insurance, and a lot of insurers were just
throwing it in for free on other policies . . . . Today, premiums of $10,000 to $15,000
a year for one lawyer are common.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
77. See generally Jay A. Soled, Third-Party Civil Tax Penalties and Professional
Standards, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1611 (discussing the third-party civil tax penalties
applied in three major categories: (1) tax shelter promoters and abettors, (2)
income tax return preparers, and (3) information return preparers).
78. See sources cited supra note 1.
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them. What practitioners do not know, however, is what their
ultimate financial exposure may be. The fear of being sued but not
knowing the downside risk can have a transformative effect on
practitioners and how they practice, causing them to be more
cautious and to eschew overly aggressive tax planning.
D. Punishing Wayward Practitioners with Nontraditional Sanctions:
Shaming and Reputational Harm
In addition to financial costs, there are nonfinancial costs
pertaining to malpractice litigation, such as shame and reputational
harm. Like financial costs, these nonfinancial costs (or their threat)
are persuasive in extracting tax compliance from tax practitioners.
At least one well-recognized study indicates that for shaming to be
a truly effective deterrent to tax noncompliance, the following four
conditions must be met:
“[(1)] audience awareness and
participation, [(2)] a cohesive body of would-be offenders who
perceive and are sensitive to the same shame, [(3)] judicial personnel
and procedures that can tailor sanctions to the target audience
sensitivities, and [(4)] a formal means of reintegrating shamed
79
offenders.” Malpractice litigation arguably fulfills the first two of
these conditions: First, the public and practitioners are informed
about tax shelter malpractice suits via the public media and
80
professional journals. Second, within each state, tax practitioners
are a fairly cohesive cohort commonly working and attending tax
81
seminars together. It is a bit more difficult to prove that the third
and forth conditions are satisfied. The IRS Office of Professional
Responsibility, however, has made strides in tailoring the punishment
to the magnitude of the transgression; likewise, the same agency has

79. Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1880, 1917 (1991).
80. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
81. For example, the Tax Section of the American Bar Association (1) holds
semiannual meetings that are usually well attended by a coterie of tax attorneys with
practices throughout the country, (2) publishes quarterly news reports, and
(3) cosponsors publication of the Tax Lawyer. See generally ABA: Section of Taxation,
http://www.abanet.org/tax/home.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2008). For nearly a
century, New York University has annually sponsored a tax institute that attracts
attorneys and accountants from throughout the country. See NYU Sch. of
Continuing
and
Prof’l
Studies,
67th
Inst.
on
Fed.
Taxation,
http://www.scps.nyu.edu/splash/ift.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2008) (touting
discussions regarding the “latest technical, legislative, and planning developments”);
cf. Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor’s Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 75 (1998) (asserting that lawyers
“usually value their reputations within the larger community and may be more likely
to respond to shaming sanctions”).
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82

attempted to reintegrate shamed offenders. Thus, shaming has the
potential to be effective in the sphere of tax practice because tax
practitioners, like other professionals, fear “banishment from the
83
community.”
Consider that during the heyday of the most recent tax shelter
bonanza, tax practitioners who orchestrated these abusive tax shelters
were viewed with tremendous esteem, gaining semi-star status at their
firms. After all, once in place, these abusive tax shelters proved to be
a cash cow because they could easily be replicated for very little cost
84
and with tremendous revenue generation. One associate described
Paul Daugerdas, the chief engineer of many of the 1990s most
abusive tax shelters, as the “focal point” in the Chicago office of
85
Jenkens & Gilchrist.
When the IRS challenged the bona fides of these abusive tax
shelters, the initial reaction was that not all was lost. After all, tax
professionals involved in formulating these abusive tax shelters could
assuage themselves and their consciences by rationalizing that IRS
challenges were a typical cost of doing business and providing tax
advice. In fact, these IRS challenges could be viewed as a positive
development insofar as additional fees could potentially be generated
by offering taxpayers defense counsel.
But as the IRS’s successes began to mount and as former clients
began to commence malpractice actions, these practitioners
86
experienced a plunging fall from grace. Professional malpractice
claims usually come as an explosive shock to the system:
82. See, e.g., I.R.S. News Release IR-2007-197 (Dec. 9, 2007), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=176212,00.html (noting that in a
settlement with the Office of Professional Responsibility, attorneys who had engaged
in questionable practices agreed on a going-forward basis “to comply fully with
practices and procedures implemented by their current firm in its public finance
group, including but not limited to (i) submitting new matters to a review and
approval process, (ii) completing questionnaires and checklists to document the due
diligence activities undertaken in the matter, and (iii) following practices and
procedures established by the firm’s opinion committee for municipal bond
opinions”).
83. Massaro, supra note 79, at 1903.
84. See, e.g., MINORITY STAFF OF PERM. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. TAX
SHELTER INDUSTRY:
THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTANTS, LAWYERS AND FINANCIAL
PROFESSIONALS, FOUR KPMG CASE STUDIES: FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS AND SC2, S. REP. NO.
108-34, at 3 (2003) (“[A]ll four [tax shelters] generated significant fees for [KPMG],
producing total revenues in excess of $124 million.”); Ben Wang, Supplying the Tax
Shelter Industry: Contingent Fee Compensation for Accountants Spurs Production, 76 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1237, 1257–58 (2003) (discussing the lucrative nature of tax shelters and the
low cost and little effort required in selling the shelters because they were “packaged
products”).
85. Braverman, supra note 12.
86. See supra note 55 (detailing how several practitioners who peddled abusive tax
shelters found themselves the subject of a criminal indictment).
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professionals are used to directing clients, not having clients direct
them. Moreover, practitioners are used to scrutinizing clients’
actions, not having clients scrutinize their actions.
There is one further speculative dimension to consider, namely,
the effect that these malpractice suits had on the interpersonal
relationships of these tax professionals. How strange it must have
been for these tax professionals to have to share with their family,
friends, and neighbors the emotional trauma associated with being
confronted with a malpractice suit and, no less, to read about
themselves on the front page in the popular press and practitioner
87
journals regarding the averred shortcomings in their abilities.
As a result of these malpractice claims, tax professionals who had
met with financial and professional success their entire careers had to
come face-to-face with intense shame and reputational harm in their
homes, at the office, and around their communities.
Tax
practitioners were publicly disgraced for failing to fulfill their
88
professional duties.
Although such public embarrassment contains no positive
attributes for those thrust infamously into the public limelight, shame
and reputational harm are, in fact, virtues of the tax shelter
malpractice litigation because they will lead to tax compliance in the
future. Not only will such tactics deter defendant practitioners from
similar shenanigans, they will deter other, compliant, practitioners
who have seen from the sidelines the effect of such consequences
upon their colleagues.
E. Raising the Ethical Bar
A final virtue of the tax shelter malpractice litigation is a renewed
interest in and push for the ethical behavior that one should ideally
expect from tax practitioners.
By way of background, the guidelines for regulating attorney
behavior are authored by the American Bar Association (“ABA”) and
are compiled in several sources, including the ABA Model Code, the
ABA Model Rules, and the formal opinions promulgated by the ABA
Committee on Professional Ethics that interpret the Model Code and

87. These stories of malpractice litigation spanned the media spectrum, from
newspapers (e.g., Rick Rothacker, Ruling Puts Tax-Shelter Lawsuit Nearer Trial,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, June 25, 2007, at 8A) to professional journals (e.g., Heather
Cole, IRS Looked into St. Louis’s Lewis Rice & Fingersh Tax Advice, MO. LAW. WKLY., Aug.
27, 2007).
88. See supra note 13 (giving examples of national media coverage of the tax
shelter fallout for tax practitioners).
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89

the Model Rules. All such guidelines are administered by state bar
90
disciplinary boards.
The rules governing tax return positions are found in three ABA
91
ethical opinions. When an attorney advises a client with respect to a
tax-controversy representation and negotiation and settlement
proceedings, the attorney must satisfy a confidence level of
“reasonable basis,” or a 10 percent to 20 percent likelihood of success
92
on the merits. When an attorney advises on tax-reporting positions,
a slightly higher level of confidence, a “realistic possibility of
93
success,” is required, which allows the lawyer to advise a position as
long as she believes in good faith that the advice possesses a 33
94
And, finally, when an attorney
percent likelihood of success.
provides a tax shelter opinion that she knows or should know will be
relied upon by third parties, the lawyer “functions more as an advisor
than as an advocate” and must render a “more likely than not”
opinion that the transaction in question would succeed if it were
95
challenged by the IRS.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”)
is the professional organization that promulgates the ethical
responsibilities of accountants. These ethical standards are found in
eight so-called “Statements on Standards for Tax Services.”
Statement on Standards for Tax Services Number 1 specifically
provides that members only advocate tax return positions that meet a
“realistic possibility” of success standard (which is very similar in
nature to the ABA “realistic possibility of success” return position
96
standard).
89. See generally WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 10.
90. Id. § 103.2.
91. See Richard A. Shaw, Ethics and the Internal Revenue Service, in PARTNERSHIPS,
LLCS, AND LLPS: UNIFORM ACTS, TAXATION, DRAFTING, SECURITIES, AND BANKRUPTCY
1009, 1041–42 (ALI-ABA 2008) (listing three ABA Formal Opinions as significant).
92. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 314 (1965).
93. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985).
94. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1) (2008) (defining realistic possibility of being
sustained on its merits (realistic possibility standard) as a position where “a
reasonable and well-informed analysis by a person knowledgeable in the tax law
would lead such a person to conclude that the position has approximately a one in
three, or greater, likelihood of being sustained on its merits”).
95. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1982).
When lawyers represent individual clients, however, Opinion 346 indicates that the
lawyer’s relationship with the IRS is adversarial. Id.
96. The professional rules governing accountants’ ethical responsibilities when
providing tax services are found in two sources: the AICPA Code of Professional
Conduct (“AICPA Code”) and the AICPA Statements on Standards for Tax Services
(“Statements”). The AICPA Code consists of two parts. The first part is aspirational
in nature, asking practicing accountants to exercise integrity, objectivity, and due
care. CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT § 51.2 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants
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Aside from the standards set by the ABA and the AICPA, Congress,
97
under guidelines commonly referred to as Circular 230, has
authorized the Treasury Department to issue guidelines to keep
98
practitioners (and, by extension, taxpayers) in check. In particular,
under Circular 230, practitioners must fulfill various regulatory
requirements when issuing an opinion letter pertaining to tax
shelters: they must exercise due diligence as to all relevant facts;
relate the law to the facts; and, where possible, provide an opinion
whether it is more likely than not that a taxpayer will prevail on the
99
merits with respect to each material tax issue.
These standards and guidelines nevertheless fell short in curbing
aggressive tax planning. Why? In rendering tax opinions pertaining
to tax shelters, practitioners routinely determined that the
100
transactions in question were more likely than not to be sustained.
2007), available at http://www.aicpa.org/About/code/et_50.html. The second part
contains minimal levels of conduct (e.g., due professional care) below which a CPA
may not fall without triggering disciplinary action. Id. §§ 91.1, 91.2. The Statements
“delineate members’ responsibilities to taxpayers, the public, the government, and
the profession.” STATEMENTS ON STANDARDS FOR TAX SERVICES, preface para. 7
(Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2000). The Statements do not represent
enforceable standards (albeit state boards are at liberty to make violations subject to
disciplinary action). See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61H1-22.0086 (2008)
(providing that licensees performing tax services follow the Statements of
Responsibilities in Tax Practice as published by the AICPA). Insofar as tax return
preparation is concerned, the governing Statement provides that practitioners
should only advance a position in which they have “a good-faith belief that the tax
return position being recommended has a realistic possibility of being sustained
administratively or judicially on its merits, if challenged.” STATEMENT ON STANDARDS
FOR TAX SERVICES NO. 1, interpretation 1-1 para. 1 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 2000). This Statement does not define the meaning of the phrase
“realistic possibility of success,” but the AICPA has described it as being somewhere
between the stringent “more likely than not” standard (or greater than 50%) and the
fairly lax “reasonable basis” standard (which ranges between 10% and 15%).
STATEMENT ON STANDARDS FOR TAX SERVICES NO. 1, interpretation 1-1 para. 5 (Am.
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2000).
97. 31 C.F.R. pt. 10 (2008).
98. Due to the important role that tax return professionals play in the tax system,
under Circular 230, Congress has authorized the Treasury Department to issue its
own set of guidelines to govern those who may practice before the IRS. 31 U.S.C. §
330 (2006). The IRS Office of Professional Responsibility has primary responsibility
for the administration of Circular 230 and is authorized to take disciplinary action
against tax practitioners deemed to be in violation of its rules. 31 C.F.R. § 10.1
(2008). Insofar as the preparation of tax returns is concerned, Circular 230 sets
forth general rules for tax practitioners to follow. In particular, all tax return
positions must have a realistic possibility (i.e., a one-in-three chance) of being
sustained on the merits. 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (2008). See JONATHAN G. BLATTMACHR,
MITCHELL M. GANS & DAMIEN RIOS, THE CIRCULAR 230 DESKBOOK (2006) (providing a
detailed discussion of Circular 230).
99. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.33(a)(2), 10.35 (2008).
100. See, e.g., Arnold v. KPMG LLP, 543 F. Supp. 2d 230, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“In
furtherance of the scheme, (and presumably, to boost confidence in the legitimacy
of the tax strategies), KPMG not only provided its own opinion letters, but also
negotiated with Brown & Wood to supply legal opinion letters. These legal opinion
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They reached their conclusions on the theory that every element of
the transaction meticulously met the requirements of the Code and
the promulgated regulations or was sanctioned under existing case
101
law.
Furthermore, practitioners’ opinion letters attempted to tackle the
application of judicial doctrines (such as the economic substance
doctrine) that disallow noneconomic losses, distinguishing them on
the basis that the transactions in question were purportedly fused
102
with economic substance. The economic substance of most of the
failed tax shelters hinged on an infinitesimally small potential
economic upside that would richly reward taxpayers if certain
103
conditions were met; however, in the thousands of tax shelters that
were peddled, not once were such conditions ever met. For courts to
have sustained the practitioners’ analysis, the courts would have had
104
to ignore the long line of cases that disallowed noneconomic losses,
even if there was a scintilla of economic substance. Instead, IRS
105
challenges met with overwhelming success in the courtroom and in
letters, issued to purchasers of the strategies, further assured the buyers that the tax
strategies would ‘more likely than not’ pass IRS scrutiny.”); Swartz v. KPMG L.L.P.,
476 F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir. 2007) (“While the engagement letter acknowledges the
possibility of an audit, it also contains assurances that the plan would more likely
than not be upheld over an IRS challenge.”).
101. See, e.g., ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 245 (3d Cir. 1998) (detailing
taxpayer’s contention “that, because the transactions on their face satisfied each
requirement of the contingent installment sale provisions and regulations
thereunder, it properly deducted the losses arising from its ‘straightforward
application’ of these provisions”).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Stein, 429 F. Supp. 2d 633, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(contending that the option letter drafted “regarding the economic substance of the
BLIPS template transaction was objectively reasonable”).
103. See, e.g., Paul Braverman, Still in the Shadows, AM. LAW., Oct. 1, 2003, available
at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1063212108768 (detailing the internal email sent by the then No. 2 man at KPMG, Jeff Stein, where he argued that a FLIP
tax shelter had to be replaced with the OPIS shelter as the FLIPs were a “tax
disaster,” i.e., they lacked economic substance “[b]ecause a shelter user had to buy a
stock warrant in a Cayman Islands company that ‘was really illusory and stood out
more like a sore thumb, since no one in his right mind would pay such an exorbitant
price for such a warrant’”).
104. The economic substance inquiry requires an objective determination of
whether a reasonable possibility of profit from the transaction existed, exclusive of
tax benefits. See, e.g., Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 441–42 (4th Cir.
2006); IES Indus. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 353 (8th Cir. 2001); Lerman v.
Comm’r, 939 F.2d 44, 49 (3d Cir. 1991); Gilman v. Comm’r, 933 F.2d 143, 146
(3d Cir. 1991); Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985).
Many of the most recently formulated tax shelters were deemed to lack economic
substance. See, e.g., Stable Creek Investments, LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636
(2008) (transactions lacked economic substance beyond securing a tax advantage).
105. See Crystal Tandon, Senior IRS Officials Tout Tax Shelter Victories, 2006 TAX
NOTES TODAY 179-1 (reporting officials’ comments on the IRS’s successful results in
Black & Decker, 436 F.3d 431; Coltec Indus., 454 F.3d 1340; TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United
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106

and some accounting firms subsequently
case settlements,
107
acknowledged that these shelters were void of economic substance.
These results belied the hollowness of practitioners’ declarations that
the shelters were more likely than not to be sustained; to the
contrary, these shelters were mere shams that, on their merits, had
virtually no chance of being sustained.
Practitioners were not the only ones who ignored the standards
that they were charged with upholding. State disciplinary boards
miserably failed to reprimand rogue practitioners for orchestrating
108
abusive tax shelters.
Indeed, with respect to the most recent wave
of failed tax shelters, there is not a single reported case in which a
state disciplinary board reprimanded or censured practitioners or
instituted other forms of punishment pertaining to the promotion of
abusive tax shelters and practitioners’ failure to adhere to the
109
governing standards of practice. This abdication of responsibility is

States (Castle Harbors), 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006); and Jade Trading, LLC v. United
States, 65 Fed. Cl. 487 (2005)).
106. See Sheryl Stratton, Chief Counsel Sees Work on Guidance and Shelters Pay Off,
2003 TAX NOTES TODAY 47-2 (detailing that as a result of the settlement initiatives,
the IRS has claimed that 92% of the 488 taxpayers involved in basis-shifting
transactions have accepted the settlement terms); Sheryl Stratton, Inside OTSA: A
Bird’s-Eye View of Shelter Central at the IRS, 2003 TAX NOTES TODAY 174-2 (touting that
all but five to ten of the COLI cases had been settled).
107. See Letter from David N. Kelley, U.S. Attorney, S. Dist. of N.Y., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Robert S. Bennett, Attorney, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom L.L.P.,
supra note 6, at 2 (“[F]rom 1996 until 2002, KPMG . . . [through the conduct of its
tax partners,] [a]ssisted high net worth United States citizens to evade United States
individual income taxes on billions of dollars in capital gain and ordinary income by
developing, promoting and implementing unregistered and fraudulent tax
shelters.”).
108. See Joe M. Chambers, New Developments in the Fight Against Tax Shelters:
Unethical Behavior Under Fire, 30 J. LEGAL PROF. 117, 118–19 (2006) (“Although state
bar associations should be enforcing the ethical standards they set for their
members, they do not appear to enforce them in the tax shelter context. The
governing bodies for CPAs, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(A.I.C.P.A.) and individual state licensing boards, appear to have been equally
inactive in enforcing their rules prohibiting accountants from engaging in unethical
conduct in connection with tax shelters.”). But see In re Conduct of Cobb, 190 P.3d
1217, 1237 (Or. 2008) (reviewing the ruling of state disciplinary board that attorney
who participated in tax shelter was culpable for misrepresentation, dishonesty, and
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and ultimately holding that the
bar association had not met its burden of proving the attorney culpable and thus he
should be reprimanded).
109. See Chambers, supra note 108, at 118 (revealing that only a few, if any,
attorneys have ever faced disciplinary action from their state bar associations for the
issuance of fraudulent opinion letters). Only in extremely rare instances will state
ethics boards bring disciplinary proceedings against practitioners who promote
aggressive tax shelters. See, e.g., In re Hendricks, 761 P.2d 519 (Or. 1988) (supporting
state licensing board’s disbarment of attorney who established fraudulent tax shelters
for clients).
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consistent with a long line of studies and literature revealing that
110
legal professional standards are regularly not enforced.
Even though practitioners essentially ignored the standards that
were designed to govern their practices and professional boards
played the role of silent abettors, the tax shelter malpractice litigation
did reinvigorate the ethical bar. In at least a few tax shelter
malpractice cases, charges were levied against defendant practitioners
that they failed to adhere to the standards of practice governing their
111
By leveling these
profession and, as such, committed malpractice.
charges, plaintiffs imbued life into the otherwise inert ethical
standards. Although case law does not reveal if judges, juries, or
arbitrators found that these alleged ethical violations constituted
malpractice, the fact that courts did not dismiss these charges
signifies the seriousness of these allegations and the likelihood that
they played an important role in coloring the final court, arbitration,
112
or settlement decision.
***
The latest wave of tax shelter malpractice cases has discouraged the
tax shelter industry. It has leveled the tax-avoidance playing field,
aligned the interests of taxpayers and their advisers with those of the
government, and punished overaggressive tax advisers with financial
penalties and public humiliation. In the process, the recent tax
shelter malpractice episode has underscored the importance of more
110. Several commissioned reports have questioned the ability of the legal
profession to police itself. E.g., ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT
(1970) (the so-called Clark Report, eponymously named for the commission’s chair,
retired Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark); ABA CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY,
LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON EVALUATION
OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1992) (the so-called McKay Report, eponymously
named for the commission’s chair, NYU law professor Robert McKay). For
accountants, the AICPA has published a report on the need to improve enforcement
of ethical standards. See generally Lisa A. Snyder, Streamlining Ethics Enforcement, 196
J. ACCT. 51 (2003) (discussing the AICPA’s Professional Ethics Enforcement
Committee’s reports on how the institute could improve its disciplinary process).
111. See, e.g., Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 363, 368
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (contending that “defendants either knew or should have known
from the outset that the COBRA tax shelter would not pass muster with the IRS or
Virginia tax authorities,” implicitly suggesting that the more-likely-than-not
requirement posited under Circular 230 was not met). See generally Joseph J.
Portuondo, Abusive Tax Shelters, Legal Malpractice, and Revised Formal Ethics Opinion
346: Does Revised 346 Enable Third Party Investors to Recover from Tax Attorneys Who
Violate Its Standards?, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 220 (1986) (analyzing how the ABA’s
issuance of Revised Formal Ethics Opinion 346 impacted the ethical considerations
taken by the Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility in tax shelter
cases).
112. Supra note 111.
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rigorous practice standards and, more importantly, of holding
practitioners to heightened standards. The next part of this Article
extrapolates these virtues associated with the tax shelter malpractice
cases into general lessons designed to foster tax compliance.
II. LESSONS FOR TAX COMPLIANCE
The current tax enforcement regime would benefit from policies
emphasizing the virtues previously identified in tax shelter
malpractice cases. Five important lessons (premised upon the
foregoing virtues) emerge from the tax shelter malpractice
experience: (1) to level the playing field, the IRS must have more
resources and greater access to information; (2) practitioners and
taxpayers need inducements to forge a common alliance with the
government; (3) traditional sanctions must be strengthened and
enforced; (4) nontraditional sanctions must be tested and, if proven
effective, institutionalized; and (5) ethical standards must be
enforced.
A. Addressing Resource and Information Disparities
Over the last several years the IRS has experienced relatively static
113
funding, as adjusted for inflation.
Meanwhile, over this same
period of time, its responsibilities have grown tremendously. Not
only must the IRS process more tax and information returns, but
Congress has also charged the agency with several new tasks,
including monitoring of the earned income tax credit (essentially a
social welfare program) and has even suggested that the agency be
114
used to institute emergency/disaster relief.
The result of this
combination of static resources and augmented responsibilities is that
115
the IRS often finds itself overburdened.

113. See IRS OVERSIGHT BD., FY2008 IRS BUDGET RECOMMENDATION: SPECIAL
REPORT 25 (2007), available at http://www.treas.gov/irsob/reports/fy2008-budgetreport.pdf (illustrating the relatively flat funding that the IRS has received in the past
few years).
114. See generally Meredith M. Stead, Implementing Disaster Relief Through Tax
Expenditures: An Assessment of the Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Measures, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 2158 (2006) (discussing the Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 and the
Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”), providing arguments for and against the
administration of emergency relief and other social welfare programs by the IRS).
115. See Mary Mosquera, Boost IRS Funding to Avoid System Collapse, Oversight Board
Says, GOV’T COMPUTER NEWS, Mar. 15, 2005, http://www.gcn.com/online/vol1_no1/
35274-1.html (“Funding for business systems modernization at the Internal Revenue
Service should be significantly higher to cut costs and delivery time and to avoid a
catastrophic collapse of archaic legacy systems, the IRS Oversight Board said in a
report released today.”).
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Aside from shortcomings in funding, the IRS has become a
demoralized agency. In the aftermath of congressional hearings in
1997 and 1998 during which the IRS was skewered for using
116
supposedly offensive and intrusive audit and collection tactics, the
117
After these hearings,
agency lost a lot of its former stature.
Congress passed the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and
118
Reform Act of 1998, which added many taxpayer safeguards but
119
also hampered the IRS’s ability to fulfill its oversight mission. As a
result, many IRS senior staff left the agency, and those staff members
who stayed are often unable or unwilling to vigorously fulfill their
120
responsibilities.
The repercussions of a shoestring budget coupled with a
demoralized staff are most vividly captured in the precipitous drop in
the number of audits and the feeble attention given to tax
121
While national audit figures have never been robust,
collections.
122
they have fallen to historic lows.
In addition, in terms of quality,
those audits that are being conducted lack the vigor of those
116. See generally Practices and Procedures of the Internal Revenue Service: Hearings
Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. (1997) (analyzing weaknesses in the
methodology of the IRS as well as criticizing the lack of oversight); IRS Oversight:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. (1998) (examining areas where
the IRS needed additional improvement and oversight).
117. See Eric A. Lustig, IRS, Inc.—The IRS Oversight Board—Effective Reform or Just
Politics? Some Early Thoughts from a Corporate Law Perspective, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 725, 736
(characterizing the portrayal of the IRS during the hearings as “an unaccountable
purveyor of fear”).
118. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998).
119. See Ann Murphy & David Higer, The 10 Deadly Sins: A Law with Unintended
Consequences, 2002 TAX NOTES TODAY 151-39 (arguing that the decreases in both the
audit rate of individuals and the collection revenue were a result of IRS employees’
fear of prosecution).
120. See Amy Hamilton, Newspapers Link “10 Deadly Sins” to IRS Enforcement Figures
Drop, 83 TAX NOTES 1119, 1119 (1999) (“[T]he key issue appears to be fear among
the IRS employees that they will break a new law intended to protect taxpayers from
overzealous collectors.”).
121. See Murphy & Higer, supra note 119 (citing the statistical declines in the
percentage of taxpayers audited and the amount of tax revenue collected as evidence
of the IRS’s ineffectiveness).
122. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGHLIGHTS OF GAO-05-566: INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE: ASSESSMENT OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2006 BUDGET REQUEST 11 (2005),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05566.pdf (providing that IRS audit
rates declined steeply from 1995 to 1999, but the audit rate has slowly increased since
2000); Albert B. Crenshaw, IRS Putting LIFE on Line in Bid To Improve Corporate Audits,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 6, 2003, at 10 (“Only about a third of very large businesses are
audited every year, down from more than half as recently as 1995. Audit rates for
businesses with assets of between $10 million and $250 million, . . . plunged to 10
percent to 15 percent in 2001 from 20 percent to 30 percent in the early 1990s.”);
Stephen Joyce, Everson Letter Says IRS Will Forfeit Billions, Lack Auditors Unless FY2005
Request Is Met, 189 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) G-8 (Sept. 30, 2004) (expressing concern
that a lack of funding may result in a steep drop in the audit rate).
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123

Furthermore, the liens and levies that the
conducted in the past.
IRS institutes to secure collection of unpaid taxes have basically
124
As prescribed by Congress, for several years after these
stopped.
hearings, the agency has been more attuned to servicing taxpayers
125
than monitoring compliance.
Some taxpayers evidently took the congressional attack on the IRS
as a cue that tax noncompliance was tacitly being condoned. We
know this from the growth of the tax gap, i.e., the difference between
what taxpayers should have paid and what they actually paid on a
timely basis. As most recently reported, the tax gap for 2001 was $345
billion, an amount equal to 16.3 percent of taxes owed and the
126
Abusive tax shelter activity
largest dollar figure ever recorded.
reportedly accounted for a large, albeit undetermined, percentage of
127
the tax gap’s total.
Not only does the IRS lack the resources necessary to ensure tax
compliance, it lacks adequate access to information as well. On many
occasions, the IRS’s attempt to access information has been stymied
128
by taxpayers invoking the attorney-client privilege and the work129
product doctrine.
Use of these privileges has engendered an
123. See W. Edward Afield, Agency Activism as a New Way of Life: Administrative
Modification of the Internal Revenue Code Through Limited Issue Focused Examinations, 7
FLA. TAX REV. 455, 457 (2006) (“In the name of increasing efficiency and better
utilizing limited resources, the IRS has begun to adopt audit policies that overly favor
taxpayers and greatly hinder the IRS’s ability to perform thorough audits.”).
124. See David Cay Johnston, Inquiries Find Little Abuse by Tax Agents, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 15, 2000, at C1 (“Collection has grown so lax that some prominent tax advisers
said in interviews last year that they were amazed that the I.R.S. was not trying to
collect taxes owed by their clients.”).
125. See generally Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the
Partial Paradigm Shift in Tax Administration in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of
1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 78–128 (2004) (discussing this change in the IRS’s mission
after the Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998).
126. I.R.S. News Release IR-2006-28 (Feb. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=158619,00.html. See generally IRS, The
Tax Gap, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=158619,00.html (last visited
Oct. 1, 2008) (providing a variety of links to publications about the tax gap).
127. See Tax Shelters: Who’s Buying, Who’s Selling, and What’s the Government Doing
About It?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. 32 (2003) [hereinafter
Brostek Hearing], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04104t.pdf (statement
of Michael Brostek, Director, Tax Issues) (estimating the annual tax gap attributable
to abusive tax shelters to be billions of dollars).
128. See, e.g., Boca Investerings P’ship v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C.
1998) (affirming that purely legal opinions are protected under attorney-client
privilege).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 150 (D.R.I. 2007)
(determining that taxpayers need not disclose tax-accrual work papers prepared in
anticipation of litigation); Long-Term Capital Holdings v. United States, No. 3:01 CV
1290, 2003 WL 1548770, at *9 (D. Conn. Feb. 1, 2003) (holding that a built-in loss
transaction legal opinion prepared “with an eye toward litigation” is protected under
the work-product doctrine).
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information disparity that has given taxpayers an undue advantage in
130
litigation and in settlement negotiations.
The attorney-client privilege is found in the federal rules of
131
evidence. The purpose of this evidentiary rule is “to encourage full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law
132
“[I]n order for the attorney-client
and administration of justice.”
privilege to attach, the communication in question must be made:
(1) in confidence; (2) in connection with the provision of legal
services; (3) to an attorney; and (4) in the context of an attorney133
client relationship.” Because the attorney-client privilege curbs the
court’s access to valuable information, it is generally construed
134
narrowly.
A counterpart to the attorney-client privilege is the tax
135
this privilege
practitioner–client privilege.
Enacted in 1998,
protects communications made to a federally authorized tax
practitioner (such as a certified public accountant (CPA) or an
136
137
enrolled agent) pertaining to tax advice. This privilege, however,
departs from the general attorney-client privilege insofar as
communications pertaining to “tax shelters” (as defined in Code
138
§ 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii)) are not afforded any evidentiary protections.
Historically, the attorney-client privilege has fulfilled its purpose in
allowing taxpayers to secure tax advice from their attorneys without
fear that the IRS could later use these communications to assert a tax

130. See discussion infra (discussing the effects that follow from the use of these
privileges).
131. FED. R. EVID. 501; FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Both I.R.C. § 7453 (2000) and Tax
Court Rule 143(a) require that federal evidentiary rules be employed by the Tax
Court.
132. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
133. Evergreen Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 122, 128 (2007)
(internal citations omitted).
134. See United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1500 (2d Cir. 1995) (disallowing
an attorney-client privilege claim where inside counsel requested a tax analysis be
prepared by the company’s accountant regarding an upcoming company
reorganization).
135. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-206, 112 Stat. 750 (1998).
136. See I.R.C. § 7525(a)(3)(A) (West 2008) (“The term ‘federally authorized tax
practitioner’ means any individual who is authorized under Federal law to practice
before the Internal Revenue Service if such practice is subject to Federal regulation
under section 330 of title 31, United States Code.”).
137. I.R.C. § 7525(a)(1).
138. I.R.C. § 7525(b) (Supp. 2005) (“The privilege under subsection (a) shall not
apply to any written communication which is— . . . (2) in connection with the
promotion of the direct or indirect participation of the person in any tax shelter (as
defined in section 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii)).”).

300

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:267

139

deficiency. However, this privilege does have limits. In particular,
the scope of this privilege does not extend to tax return
140
preparation, including opinion letters pertaining to tax return
141
142
preparation. Furthermore, with rare exception, neither taxpayers
nor their advisers can assert this privilege to protect the identities of
143
those taxpayers who invest in tax shelters. Finally, this privilege does
not apply to “communications ‘made for the purpose of getting
144
advice for the commission of a fraud’ or crime.”
Despite the foregoing attorney-client privilege limitations, this
privilege remains a major impediment to the IRS in its ability to
145
secure relevant documentation relating to abusive tax shelters.
Consider the recent half-decade-long battle that the IRS has endured
to obtain relevant documentation from the accounting firm BDO
146
Seidman.
This documentation was prepared by legal counsel to
BDO Seidman and contained internal memoranda and notes relating
to the legality of certain tax shelter products. BDO Seidman was
largely successful in thwarting the IRS’s efforts to gain access to this
valuable documentation. The documentation was deemed shielded
by the attorney-client privilege because “the memoranda in question
were prepared in order to provide legal advice to BDO, in most cases,
if not every case, in direct response to a BDO inquiry for such legal
advice and based on confidential facts provided by BDO to its outside
139. See Peter A. Lowy & Juan F. Vasquez, Jr., Attorney-Client Privilege: When Does
Tax Advice Qualify as “Legal Advice”?, 2002 TAX NOTES TODAY 237-50 (explaining that
the privilege has proven especially important in complicated tax matters where an
attorney must have a command of both facts and finances).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1985) (declaring
outright that “[i]f the client transmitted the information so that it might be used on
the tax return, such a transmission destroys any expectation of confidentiality which
might have otherwise existed”).
141. See Long-Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.
Conn. 2004); United States v. KPMG LLP, 316 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2004); United
States v. KPMG LLP, 237 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2002).
142. See United States v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807, 808 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that
the identities of all clients, who over a multi-year period paid legal fees in connection
with a tax shelter, were protected by the attorney-client privilege against an IRS
summons).
143. See United States v. BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2003); Doe v.
KPMG, LLP, 325 F. Supp. 2d 746 (N.D. Tex. 2004); United States v. Sidley Austin
Brown & Wood LLP, No. 03 C 9355, 2004 WL 816448 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2004);
United States v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., No. 02 C 6790, 2003 WL 21956404 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 15, 2003).
144. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989).
145. See Sheryl Stratton, IRS Battles Promoter Privilege Claims, 2002 TAX NOTES TODAY
110-3 (detailing former IRS Chief Counsel B. John Williams Jr.’s restrictive view
regarding the attorney-client privilege in tax matters).
146. See United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 809–14 (7th Cir. 2007)
(detailing in painstaking fashion the myriad litigation between the IRS and BDO in
the five years leading up to the 2007 decision).
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147

The outcome of United States v. BDO Seidman is not an
counsel.”
outlier; several other courts adjudicating abusive tax shelters have
148
upheld defense counsel’s use of the attorney-client privilege.
The work-product doctrine is a sibling of the attorney-client
149
privilege. With its genesis in a U.S. Supreme Court decision, this
doctrine grants the work product of an attorney qualified immunity
from discovery. In other words, it shields the written statements,
private memoranda, and personal recollections of an attorney (or
150
other representative of a party) involved in litigation. The scope of
the work-product doctrine is unclear. A majority of courts have
construed the doctrine broadly, applying it to any legal work done
151
A minority of courts have
because of the prospect of litigation.
construed the doctrine much more narrowly, limiting its application
152
to work whose primary purpose was in anticipation of litigation.
What the tax shelter malpractice experience informs us is that tax
compliance is more likely if the IRS is put on a resource and
information par with taxpayers. In their quest for retribution,
aggrieved taxpayers who invested in failed tax shelters were able to
bring equivalent resources to the table in the form of skilled and
seasoned litigators who could tap the nation’s foremost tax,
153
In addition, these same
accounting, and economic experts.
taxpayers were able to supply their legal counsel with all of the legal
memoranda and notes in their possession, so there was little or no
information disparity. The combination of resource and information

147. United States v. BDO Seidman, No. 02 C 4822, 2004 WL 1470034, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. June 29, 2004).
148. See, e.g., TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States, 223 F.R.D. 47, 49 (D. Conn. 2004)
(holding that the attorney-client privilege is not waived by a party even if that party
places at issue the advice of counsel); Boca Investerings P’ship v. United States, No.
97-602, 1998 WL 426564, at *3–4 (D.D.C. June 9, 1998) (deciding that disclosure of
the process leading up to the transaction at issue would necessarily disclose a client’s
decisions to secure favorable tax treatment and therefore is protected by the
attorney-client privilege).
149. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The work-product doctrine is now
codified in FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
150. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510.
151. See United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998) (declaring
that the “‘because of’ formulation accords with the plain language of Rule 26(b)(3)
and the purposes underlying the work-product doctrine”); Evergreen Trading, LLC
v. United States, 80 Fed.Cl. 122, 131–33 (2007) (adopting explicitly the “because of”
test instead of the “primary purpose” test).
152. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982)
(reaffirming that the work-product doctrine protects only those materials prepared
in anticipation of litigation rather than those materials prepared in the ordinary
course of business).
153. See discussion supra Part I.
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parity proved lethal for peddlers of abusive tax shelters as, one by
one, they were generally held accountable for their dereliction.
The tax shelter malpractice experience thus imparts a clear
message: Congress must accord the IRS more funds and better access
to information. The funding part of the equation is a relatively easy
fix; it merely requires the realization that the voluntary selfassessment system we have is only as good as the monitoring systems
154
More funding will
we have in place to oversee compliance.
undoubtedly result in greater oversight and, in cases of litigation, put
the IRS on equal footing with defendant taxpayers in terms of
financial resources.
Harder to address is the information disparity that currently exists
between taxpayers and the government due, in large part, to the
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine.
Both the
privilege and the doctrine stand at odds with IRS authorization to
issue administrative summons for the production of “any books,
papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material” in
“ascertaining the correctness of any return, . . . determining the
liability of any person for any internal revenue tax[,] . . . or collecting
155
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, this is a
any such liability.”
“broad summons authority” reflecting a “congressional policy choice
in favor of disclosure of all information relevant to a legitimate IRS
156
inquiry.”
Given this policy in favor of disclosure, the detrimental role abusive
tax shelters play in widening the tax gap, and the recognition that
communications pertaining to tax shelters—at least insofar as non157
attorney advisers are concerned—are not worthy of protection,
Congress should take the following courses of action specifically
related to abusive tax shelter activity: (1) eliminate the attorneyclient privilege and (2) restrict application of the work-product
doctrine to those instances in which the legal work is performed with

154. See IRS OVERSIGHT BD., ANNUAL REPORT 2006, at 21 (2007), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/irsob/reports/2006_annual_report.pdf
(calling
upon
Congress to fund the IRS with more resources); Emily Rockwood, Comment,
Privatizing Tax Collection: A Case Study in the Outsourcing Debate, 36 PUB. CONT. L.J. 423,
433 (2007) (“Congress should realize that it could avoid contractor fraud and abuse
by providing the IRS with better funding to hire more tax collection agents and
enforcement personnel.”).
155. I.R.C. § 7602(a) (2000).
156. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 816 (1984).
157. See I.R.C. § 7525(b) (Supp. 2005) (disallowing statutory protection for
communications made by taxpayers regarding tax shelters).
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respect to actual litigation, as opposed to legal work that is merely
158
anticipatory in nature.
There are commentators who, of course, argue that the attorneyclient privilege and attorney work-product doctrine must remain a
159
vibrant part of tax practice.
But other commentators offer more
compelling arguments for the elimination or curtailment of the
158. See Bruce Kayle, The Tax Advisor’s Privilege in Transactional Matters: A Synopsis
and a Suggestion, 54 TAX LAW. 509, 550–53 (2001) (considering whether the attorneyclient privilege and the work-product privilege merit different consideration in the
tax realm and concluding that one possibility would include the application of the
attorney-client privilege only in criminal tax matters and the application of the workproduct privilege only in actual anticipation of litigation and not when the attorney
is planning or executing a transaction); see also Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis:
Confidentiality and Customer Relations, 2003 TAX NOTES TODAY 106-3 (arguing, in the
realm of tax shelter cases, that the attorney-client privilege likely provides no
protection and that use of the work-product doctrine must still be founded on
preparation in anticipation of litigation). In a recent piece, Professor Linda Beale
argues for the elimination or curtailment of evidentiary privileges as they relate to
abusive tax shelters (and, more generally, to all tax advice). Linda M. Beale, Tax
Advice Before the Return: The Case for Raising Standards and Denying Evidentiary Privileges,
25 VA. TAX REV. 583 (2006). In this piece, Professor Beale first describes how the
nature of our tax self-assessment system is distinguishable from other legal contexts
that are properly accorded attorney-client privileges. Id. at 646. As she posits,
unlike other legal regimes, tax is a set of rules that characterize the results of
taxpayer transactions for purposes of determining appropriate assessment.
It is not a set of prohibitory rules that are intended to ensure that a person’s
transactions stay on the legal side of a fixed line between legal and illegal
conduct.
Id. Second, she points out the common characteristics that tax return preparation
and general tax advice share. Given these similarities, Professor Beale argues that
there is no reason why the latter activity is afforded attorney-client privilege when the
former activity is not. Id. at 651–54. Third, she points out that recent changes in the
law require disclosure pertaining to so-called reportable transactions (Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6011-4 (2008)). In her opinion, these disclosure requirements signify a
congressional recognition that, insofar as tax-oriented legal work is concerned, the
attorney-client privilege should be very narrowly construed. Beale, supra, at 654–56.
Fourth, Professor Beale points out the ridiculousness of having inconsistent rules
whereby the practitioner-client privilege does not apply in the case of a tax shelter
(I.R.C. § 7525(b) (Supp. 2005), yet it remains fully intact in the case of attorney
communications. Beale, supra, at 656–59. Fifth, Professor Beale explains why
preservation of the attorney-client privilege is counterproductive as it connotes an
adversarial setting, which is not what the vast majority of tax return submissions
entail (unless, as she points out, taxpayers assert a very aggressive tax position that
they anticipate the IRS will challenge as being abusive). Id. at 659–63. Finally,
Professor Beale argues that the purview of the work-product doctrine should be
much narrower and not include pre-return advice because broader application of
this doctrine “would almost invariably shield from discovery most or all materials that
could shed light on the actual nature and purpose of tax-motivated transactions.” Id.
at 666. Keeping this information from disclosure does nothing to further one of the
doctrine’s purposes, namely, “to prevent a litigant from taking a free ride on the
research and thinking of his opponent’s lawyer.” United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d
496, 500 (7th Cir. 1999).
159. See generally Michael W. Loudenslager, Cover Me: The Effects of AttorneyAccountant Multidisciplinary Practice on the Protections of the Attorney-Client Privilege,
53 BAYLOR L. REV. 33, 38 (2001) (arguing for statutory protection of the attorneyclient privilege in cases of multidisciplinary attorney-accountant practices).
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attorney-client privilege and the attorney work-product doctrine,
particularly when viewed through the prism of the post–1986 Tax Act
160
tax shelter wave that has undermined our tax system’s integrity.
If the tax shelter malpractice experience teaches us anything, it is
that Congress must level the resource and information disparities
that put the IRS at a tremendous disadvantage relative to taxpayers.
If operating on a level playing field, the IRS will enjoy greater
litigation success and aggressive taxpayers will learn that their
derelictions will not be met with impunity.
B. Inducing Taxpayers and Tax Practitioners to Choose Compliance
over Avoidance
As was evident in the sphere of tax shelter malpractice litigation, if
the right set of inducements is in place, taxpayers and tax
practitioners will align their interests with those of the government,
and greater tax compliance will result. The opportunity to be made
financially whole drove taxpayers to commence litigation against
rogue practitioners, resulting in economic hardship for the
161
By the same token,
practitioners and, in some instances, job loss.
the threat of malpractice litigation led many tax practitioners to
advise conservatively and to stay within permissible ethical
162
The tax shelter malpractice experience suggests that
boundaries.
taxpayers’ and tax practitioners’ interests can be aligned with those of
the government. The question is how to put this lesson into practice.
Taxpayers. One way for taxpayers to forge an alliance with the
government would be for Congress to better publicize its newly
fashioned whistle-blower program. By way of background, for
decades there has been a system in place through which taxpayers
who offered information pertaining to other taxpayers’
163
noncompliance received a cash reward. The maximum reward was
15 percent of the tax dollars ultimately collected, capped at
164
$2 million. This reward system, however, suffered from many
systematic flaws. Reward amounts were low, arbitrarily awarded, and

160. See discussion supra note 158.
161. See, e.g., discussion supra note 6.
162. See discussion supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
163. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1 (1967) (detailing the cash reward system before
amendment).
164. Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(c) (as amended in 1998).
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166

took years to recover. In 2006, Congress decided to overhaul the
167
Code’s whistle-blower program and to centralize its management.
Since congressional passage of the 2006 whistle-blower reforms, the
reward program has been reinvigorated. The new legislation, for
example, provides a minimum reward of 15 percent and a maximum
reward of 30 percent of the tax collected, with no caps limiting
168
reward amounts.
In addition, the new legislation eliminates the
discretionary nature of the prior law, mandating instead that the IRS
make a reward payment in all cases in which it pursues a remedy
against a delinquent taxpayer based on information provided by the
169
whistle-blower.
These enhanced monetary benefits have begun to bolster tax
compliance.
For example, recently there have been several
important matters in which taxpayers have made claims under the
170
revised laws that might not have been made absent these reforms.
The initial successes of the revitalized whistle-blower program signify
that Congress and the IRS should more aggressively promote the
program to attract even more taxpayers to align their interests with
171
those of the government.
Aside from the whistle-blower program, there are other possibilities
allowing taxpayers and the IRS to build symbiotic bridges. When
possible, for example, the IRS should encourage taxpayer and tax
practitioner participation in the regulatory rule-making process. By
encouraging such involvement (via incorporating practitioners’
comments and suggestions), final regulations stand a much better

165. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., THE INFORMANTS’ REWARDS
PROGRAM NEEDS MORE CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT (2006), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2006reports/200630092fr.pdf.
166. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406(a)(1),
120 Stat. 2922, 2958 (2006).
167. Id. § 406(b). See I.R.S. News Release IR-2007-27 (Feb. 2, 2007) (detailing the
purpose of the new IRS Whistleblower Office).
168. I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1) (West 2008).
169. I.R.C. § 7623(b).
170. See Jeremiah Coder, Law Firm Submits New Record Whistle-Blower Claim, 2008
TAX NOTES TODAY 116-1 (relaying a law firm press release announcing the fact that
the law firm would be submitting a $4.4 billion tax whistle-blower claim against a
Fortune 500 company in the aftermath of congressional changes to whistle-blower
laws); Tom Herman, Whistleblower Law Scores Early Success, Higher Rewards Attract
Informants Submitting Tips, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2007, at D3 (noting that in response to
congressional changes to whistle-blower legislation, the IRS had received
approximately twenty reward claims by May 2007).
171. For an extensive and exhaustive discussion of the virtues of the whistle-blower
program, see Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX LAW.
(forthcoming 2008).
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Furthermore,
chance of public acceptance and administrability.
Congress should consider fast-tracking the National Taxpayer
173
Many of these proposals are
Advocate’s legislative proposals.
designed to lighten taxpayers’ administrative burdens and to simplify
compliance, key components in extracting taxpayer cooperation and
174
aligning taxpayer and government interests.
Tax Practitioners. In light of our adversarial judicial system,
enlisting the support of tax practitioners is inevitably difficult because
most practitioners perceive their foremost duty as one to their clients
175
In a thoughtful piece about
rather than to the government.
176
enlisting the tax bar to help instill greater taxpayer compliance,
Professor David Schizer describes the difficulty of this situation and
acknowledges that detaching tax practitioners from their clients is
177
“something that is very hard to do.”
The malpractice experience teaches us, however, that many tax
practitioners will toe the compliance line, if for no other reason, out
178
of fear of subsequently being sued for malpractice. Playing on this
fear is worthy of exploration because pure self-interest can cause tax
practitioners to rethink their blind allegiance to their clients and
realign their interests with those of the government. In particular,
Congress and legal and accounting professional associations should
179
strengthen ethical rules and bolster the enforcement of these rules.
Furthermore, more tax shelter return disclosure, which greatly
172. See David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. Letting Tax Lawyers Write Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
9, 2007, at C1 (describing a pilot program in which tax attorneys are involved in the
rule-making drafting process in order to take advantage of their tax expertise); I.R.S.
Notice 2007-17, 2007-1 C.B. 748 (describing a pilot program in which, based upon
written submissions from the public, the IRS and Treasury determine whether
guidance is appropriate regarding a finite area of tax law and, if so, use that
increased public participation to develop guidance, which would provide significant
benefits to taxpayers, such as hastened publication of more guidance projects).
173. See generally I.R.C. § 7803(c)(2)(B)(ii)(VIII) (Supp. 2005) (requiring, among
other things, that the National Taxpayer Advocate offer legislative
recommendations); 1 NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 459–557 (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/arc_2007
_vol_1_legislativerec.pdf (offering several proposals to facilitate compliance and to
reduce administrative burdens).
174. See generally CHARLES O. ROSSOTTI, MANY UNHAPPY RETURNS: ONE MAN’S QUEST
TO TURN AROUND THE MOST UNPOPULAR ORGANIZATION IN AMERICA 138–39 (2005)
(describing the office of the National Taxpayer Advocate and its goals).
175. See Camilla E. Watson, Tax Lawyers, Ethical Obligations, and the Duty to the
System, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 847, 851 (1999) (calling into question any special duty that
tax lawyers might have to the tax system). But see Randolph E. Paul, The
Responsibilities of the Tax Advisor, 63 HARV. L. REV. 377, 388 (1950) (arguing that tax
lawyers should embrace both a duty to clients and a duty to the tax system).
176. David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 TAX L. REV. 331 (2006).
177. Id. at 367.
178. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
179. See discussion infra Part IIE.
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enhances the chances of detection, is essential to making
180
practitioners leery of being too aggressive on behalf of their clients.
Finally, raising and enforcing ethical standards are powerful
mechanisms that could drive a wedge between tax practitioners and
aggressive tax advice, causing tax practitioners to align their interests
more closely with those of the government.
C. Enhancing Traditional Sanctions
What the tax shelter malpractice experience has demonstrated is
that many taxpayers and tax practitioners appear willing to subscribe
to aggressive tax positions if the economic benefits outweigh the risks
181
and associated costs. Time and time again, taxpayers were told by
legal and accounting counsel that the tax shelters were “bullet-proof”
182
against IRS attack and that even if challenged, proffered tax
183
With little or no
opinions offered insulation against penalties.
perceived economic risk, many taxpayers jumped on the tax shelter
184
bandwagon.
Tax practitioners, too, thought that their economic
risk was low because the penalty structure applicable to practitioners
185
The
who promoted abusive tax shelters was virtually nonexistent.
absence of penalties combined with the economic benefit of
handsome fees led numerous practitioners and their firms to actively
186
promote abusive tax shelters.

180. See infra text accompanying notes 195–197.
181. Cf. Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms,
86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1613 n.22 (2000) (“Rational choice theory is premised on the
assumption that individuals rationally choose among available opportunities to
achieve maximum satisfaction according to their individual preferences.”). But see
Jane B. Baron & Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques of
Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 431, 432 (1996) (remarking that
“we also have a range of preferences (and attributes and qualities) that markets
cannot satisfy—preferences that are not self-interested, but other-regarding;
preferences about our own preferences, as well as the public good”).
182. See Jacoboni v. KPMG LLP, 314 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (M.D. Fla. 2004)
(noting that plaintiff alleged that “KPMG represented that [the tax shelter] was
‘bullet proof’”).
183. See MINORITY STAFF OF PERM. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. TAX SHELTER
INDUSTRY: THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTANTS, LAWYERS AND FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS, FOUR
KPMG CASE STUDIES: FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS AND SC2, S. REP. NO. 108-34, 9 (2003)
(reporting that KPMG tax professionals “were instructed to tell potential buyers that
opinion letters provided by KPMG and Sidley Austin Brown & Wood would protect
the buyer from certain IRS penalties, if the IRS were later to invalidate the tax
product”).
184. See discussion supra note 1.
185. See generally infra notes 199–203 and accompanying text.
186. See infra Appendix (illustrating that four out the six major national
accounting firms were named defendants in tax shelter malpractice litigation).
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188

In the aftermath of settlements and cases in which the IRS
scored resounding victories, taxpayers learned that there were indeed
economic risks associated with tax shelter participation. Likewise, in
189
the aftermath of the recent malpractice cases, tax practitioners
experienced first-hand the economic risks associated with tax shelter
190
These economic hardships cast a dark shadow over
promotion.
aggressive tax planning.
191
In the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (“JOBS Act”),
Congress took further action by instituting a whole new series of
disclosure requirements and tougher penalties designed to curb
aggressive tax shelters, heightening the chances of detection and
simultaneously making the costs of tax shelter involvement
192
immeasurably greater than its averred benefits.
For taxpayers, heightened detection starts with their participation
193
in any so-called reportable transaction. Under prior law, there was
no specific penalty imposed upon taxpayers who failed to disclose a
reportable transaction; under the JOBS Act, the penalty for failing to
disclose a reportable transaction is $50,000 for corporate taxpayers
($200,000 with respect to a listed transaction) and $10,000 in the case
194
of individuals ($100,000 with respect to a listed transaction).
For tax practitioners, there is also heightened detection related to
all reportable transactions. Under prior law, the penalty for failing to
maintain an investor list was a measly $50 for each name required to
have been on the list, subject to a maximum penalty of $100,000 per
195
year.
Now, any material adviser required to maintain an investor
list bears a $10,000-per-day penalty for every day beyond a twenty-day
window period that is triggered by an initial IRS request to see the
196
The JOBS Act also introduced a new penalty for a material
list.
187. See supra note 106.
188. See, e.g., Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 515 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2008);
Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Black &
Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 441–42 (4th Cir. 2006); Jade Trading,
LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11 (2007).
189. See infra Appendix (providing a list of recent malpractice cases).
190. See discussion supra Part I.
191. American Jobs Creation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (codified in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
192. See, e.g., STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 108TH CONGRESS 361 (J. Comm. Print 2005),
available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-5-05.pdf (“[T]he Congress believed that
legislation was needed to provide the Treasury Department with additional tools to
assist its efforts to curtail abusive transactions.”).
193. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(a) (2008).
194. I.R.C. § 6707A (Supp. IV 2004).
195. I.R.C. § 6708(a) (2000), amended by I.R.C. § 6708(a) (Supp. IV 2004).
196. I.R.C. § 6708(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2004).
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adviser who fails to file an information return (or who files an
incomplete information return). In this case, the penalty is equal to
$50,000 with respect to a reportable transaction that is not a listed
transaction; however, for a listed transaction, the penalty is the
greater of (1) $200,000 or (2) 50 percent of the adviser’s gross
income attributable to the aid, assistance, or advice provided with
respect to the transaction (75 percent in the case of intentional
197
disregard).
Aside from elevating the punishments pertaining to detection,
Congress also recognized the importance of punishing those tax
practitioners who promote abusive tax shelters and those taxpayers
198
In the JOBS Act, Congress
who invest in abusive tax shelters.
strengthened several existing penalties and introduced several new
penalties. For instance, tax practitioners who now promote abusive
tax shelters based on information that they know or have reason to
know is false or fraudulent as to any material matter must bear a
penalty equal to 50 percent of the gross income derived from the
199
Moreover, Congress
activity for which the penalty is imposed.
instituted a penalty regime under new Code § 6662A applicable to all
reportable transactions. Under Code § 6662A, a 30 percent penalty
(rather than the normal 20 percent accuracy-related penalty
applicable to nonreportable transactions) applies to any
understatement attributable to a reportable transaction that a
200
There are no exceptions to
taxpayer fails to adequately disclose.
201
this penalty. If adequate disclosure is made, a 20 percent accuracy202
related penalty is imposed instead; in limited circumstances, this
203
latter penalty may be waived.
These strengthened detection and penalty regimes are designed to
change the cost-benefit analysis that tax practitioners and taxpayers
undertake when promoting or contemplating investment in abusive
tax shelters. Before these changes, the expected costs of abusive tax
shelter involvement were low and the expected benefits were high;
now, the reverse is true. Congress should continue to adhere to this
strategy. In practical terms, when necessary, Congress should
197. I.R.C. § 6707(a)–(b) (Supp IV 2004).
198. See I.R.C. § 6700(a) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
199. Id. § 6700(a)(2)(B).
200. I.R.C. § 6662A(c) (Supp. IV 2004).
201. See I.R.S. Notice 2005-12, 2005-1 C.B. 494.
202. I.R.C. § 6662A(a) (Supp. IV 2004).
203. See I.R.C. § 6664(d)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 2004) (providing waivers to the penalty
if the following conditions are met: (1) taxpayer makes adequate disclosure,
(2) there is substantial authority for such treatment, and (3) the taxpayer reasonably
believed that the tax treatment was more likely than not the proper treatment).
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institute additional detection mechanisms and, if need be, introduce
even harsher noncompliance penalties. The tax shelter malpractice
experience has shown lawmakers that tax practitioners abhor the
financial consequences associated with malpractice causes of action,
and taxpayers abhor the financial consequences that flow from IRS
audits of abusive tax shelters. This mutual abhorrence is what
Congress should look to exploit.
D. Enhancing Nontraditional Sanctions
In addition to the financial costs of the tax shelter malpractice
litigation, tax practitioners had to bear other “costs” in the form of
shaming and reputational harm. Many tax practitioners involved in
abusive tax shelter promotion were subsequently shunned by their
204
firms and ostracized by the tax and accounting communities. While
there is no specific evidence that suggests that the costs associated
with nontraditional sanctions actually deter tax avoidance, common
sense and logic dictate that they would. Indeed, a rich body of
academic literature suggests that nontraditional sanctions involving
shame and reputational harm can be powerful tools to induce tax
205
causing taxpayers to take less aggressive return
compliance,
positions and law and accounting firms to be more cautious in the
206
As IRS Chief Counsel Donald Korb once
advice they render.
succinctly said, when it comes to abusive tax shelters, “[n]o one wants
207
to be on the front cover of the Wall Street Journal.”
There are several recent examples in which lawmakers have tried
nontraditional sanctions to spur tax compliance. Some of these
legislative initiatives appear quite successful while the jury is still out
204. See, e.g., Rebecca Blumenstein, Sprint Forced Out Top Executives over Questionable
Tax Shelter, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2003, at A1 (discussing how certain employees lost
their positions).
205. See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty: Will Publicizing Tax
Information Increase Compliance?, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 1, 104–05 (2005)
(“[P]ublicity strengthens penalties because it increases the chance of getting caught
(since members of the public, especially tax experts, can study returns) and it
increases chances of public shaming for non-compliance.”); Stephen W. Mazza,
Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1065, 1144 (2003) (“Empirical
research and compliance theories also support this position, suggesting that publicity
can play a positive role in discouraging noncompliant behavior and increasing the
public’s commitment to the tax system.”). But see Joshua D. Blank, What’s Wrong with
Shaming Corporate Tax Abuse, N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (contending that
shaming corporate tax abuse may prove counterproductive).
206. See Eric Solomon, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Office of Tax Policy, Dep’t of the
Treasury, Remarks at the Tax Policy Center—Tax Analysts Forum on Tax Shelters 13
(Feb. 11, 2005), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/newsevents/
events_021105_transcript.pdf (noting that disclosure “discourages taxpayers from
entering into aggressive transactions”).
207. Id.
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on others. The use of shaming and reputational harm, for example,
has proven particularly effective for state governments that have
passed legislation requiring public disclosure of delinquent
208
taxpayers. The process ordinarily works as follows: if taxpayers owe
tax above a certain threshold and their rights to appeal have expired,
then their names are published on websites such as New Jersey’s
209
“Largest Judgmented Taxpayer Listings” and Wisconsin’s “Top 100
210
Most states that have institutionalized
Delinquent Taxpayers.”
these programs have marveled at taxpayer responsiveness,
simultaneously collecting millions of dollars of unanticipated
211
revenue. In the aftermath of this success, many states have sought
212
to broaden the scope and application of their programs, and
several more states are now in the process of adopting similar
213
programs.
On at least three recent occasions, congressional lawmakers have
experimented with the use of nontraditional sanctions to cultivate tax
compliance. First, when taxpayers renounce their citizenship for taxmotivated reasons, their names are now posted in the Federal
214
Register; furthermore, such taxpayers are prohibited from returning
215
Second, the Department of Homeland
to the United States.
Security is prohibited from entering into contracts with domestic
companies that change their place of incorporation to a foreign
208. See, e.g., Press Release, Div. of Revenue, Dep’t of Finance, State of Del.,
Online List of Delinquent Delaware Taxpayers Paying Off (Sept. 6, 2007)
[hereinafter Delinquent Taxpayers List], available at http://revenue.delaware.gov/
services/press/07_release_onlinesuccess.pdf (“Where prior collection attempts
failed, the Delinquent Taxpayers list has motivated some of Delaware’s more elusive
tax delinquents to finally come forward and pay up.”).
209. New Jersey Division of Taxation, Largest Judgmented Taxpayer Listings,
http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/index.html?jdgdiscl.htm~mainFrame (last
visited Oct. 4, 2008).
210. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, Top 100 Delinquent Taxpayers,
http://www.revenue.wi.gov/delqlist/Top100dlnq.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).
211. See, e.g., Delinquent Taxpayers List, supra note 209 (remarking that the
Department of Revenue was “extremely pleased [that] the results [of the list] have
been so positive early on”). See generally Kristen Wyatt, States Use Shame as Tax
Collecting Tool: Web Sites Publish Names of Residents with Delinquent Tax Bills, WASH.
POST, May 9, 2004, at A10 (claiming that states had some success in collecting money
from delinquent taxpayers with public shaming websites).
212. See, e.g., Wisconsin Department of Revenue, Wisconsin Delinquent Taxpayers,
http://www.revenue.wi.gov/html/delqlist.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2008) (noting
that Wisconsin recently lowered its posting threshold on the Internet from $25,000
to $5,000).
213. Tom Herman, Deadbeats Risk Cybershame, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2007, at D2
(“While [shaming tax deadbeats] may strike some people as needlessly cruel, officials
in the growing number of states that have launched similar campaigns over the past
decade say the technique works.”).
214. I.R.C. § 6039G(d)(3) (Supp. IV 2004).
215. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10)(E) (2006).
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216

Finally, companies that pay penalties for failing to
jurisdiction.
disclose to the IRS the fact that they entered into listed transactions
must report the penalty payment with their annual filings to the
217
Securities and Exchange Commission.
These congressional forays into the use of nontraditional sanctions
have not been without their detractors. One commentator, for
example, argues that nontraditional sanctions, such as the
banishment of taxpayers who expatriate for tax-motivated reasons,
can be ineffectual because they are ill-conceived and not well218
coordinated with other legislative initiatives. Another commentator
has detailed why shaming those individuals and firms involved with
219
abusive corporate tax shelters may prove counterproductive.
Despite these criticisms, lawmakers should not abandon the use of
nontraditional sanctions. Instead, lawmakers should address the
legitimate concerns of these commentators.
In other words,
nontraditional sanctions should be properly conceived, wellcoordinated, and used only where effective. Beyond the additional
costs such sanctions impose upon noncompliant taxpayers,
nontraditional sanctions serve two important secondary functions.
First, nontraditional sanctions help mold social norms, sending a
general signal to the community regarding appropriate behavior and
220
Recalibrated social
the shared expectations of the community.
norms can be powerful forces that can change noncompliance
221
Second, these
orientations and attitudes to those of compliance.
222
nontraditional sanctions have symbolic value,
delivering
216. 6 U.S.C. § 395 (2006).
217. I.R.C. § 6707A(e)(2) (Supp. IV 2004).
218. Michael S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law: Symbols,
Shaming, and Social Norm Management as a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89 IOWA L.
REV. 863, 898–900 (2004). Ten years after the passage of the Reed Amendment, no
former citizen has been denied reentry to the United States. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, IMMIGRANT AND NONIMMIGRANT VISA INELIGIBILITIES: FISCAL YEAR 2007, at
tbl.XX, available at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/FY07AnnualReportTableXX.pdf
(tabulating the number of visa ineligibles on the grounds of refusal under the
Immigration and Nationality Act).
219. See Blank, supra note 205.
220. See generally Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997) (asserting that norms govern behaviors because
people seek the esteem of others, leading individuals to conform their behaviors to
the unanimous view of those around them); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive
Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996) (explaining how legal expressions
correct social behaviors of which most people disapprove).
221. See generally Susan Cleary Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation
Tax Shelter Compliance Norm, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 961 (2006) (arguing that the
increase of government enforcement and disclosure of deviant transactions had
strengthened compliance norms at large corporations).
222. See generally Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The
Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty and the Prison Litigation Reform
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reassurance to law-abiding taxpayers and tax practitioners that
lawmakers are taking steps to rein in abusive tax practices. In sum,
nontraditional sanctions constitute another possible arrow in the
quiver of congressional tax compliance measures; it is an arrow that
Congress should aim with care, for, if properly targeted, it may help
curb tax noncompliance.
E. Enforcing the Ethical Bar
Over the last several decades, state bars, accounting associations,
and the Treasury Department have each gradually raised ethical
223
standards governing tax practice.
Despite these higher ethical
standards, abusive tax shelters flourished in the 1990s and early
224
2000s. Aside from the fact that prior to passage of the JOBS Act a
violation of these ethical standards did not carry with it monetary
225
penalties or censure, the fundamental problem has been one of
226
Regarding the lag in federal enforcement, the
enforcement.
Director of Practice, the organization charged with enforcement of
Circular 230 at the time, was not given adequate resources to do the
227
Regarding the lag in state enforcement, state bars and
job.
accounting associations did not adequately fund or staff their
228
disciplinary units. Due to these deficiencies in enforcement, rogue
practitioners who routinely issued more-likely-than-not opinion
letters pertaining to abusive tax shelters were, by and large, not
229
reprimanded.
Ethical standards enforcement involves two tactics. One way to
address the absence of enforcement is to devote more resources to
Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1 (1997) (suggesting that a symbolic statute, or statute that is
enacted by legislators to make a point, can pose an interpretative problem).
223. See supra Part I.E.
224. See supra note 1.
225. See American Jobs Creation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 822, 118 Stat. 1413
(2004) (adding the ability to impose monetary penalties and censure for ethical
standard violations).
226. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2003-3 (Jan. 8, 2003), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=105533,00.html (“With the additional
resources, the Office of Professional Responsibility will thoroughly concentrate on
enforcing the standards of practice for those who represent taxpayers before the IRS
. . . .”).
227. See id. (discussing how the Office of Professional Responsibility, which
replaced the Director of Practice, would “have more than twice the staff that was
available under the previous organization”).
228. See supra note 110 (questioning the ability of the legal profession to police
itself).
229. See Jeremiah Coder, OPR Makes Changes to Public Disclosure of Sanctions, 2008
TAX NOTES TODAY 103-1 (reporting that the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility
would begin publishing sanctions in a new format, including, for the first time, a
column listing the specific section of Circular 230 that was violated).
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the problem to increase the risk of detection, prosecution, and
230
Indeed, the IRS is currently utilizing this
penalty imposition.
231
strategy to ramp up its prosecution of ethical violations; state bar
232
and accounting associations are also trying to follow suit.
The use of malpractice suits is another way to inject life into
promulgated ethical standards. Consider that in several recent tax
shelter malpractice cases, plaintiff taxpayers based their claims, in
233
part, upon practitioners’ purported ethical violations.
This fact
signifies the importance that plaintiff taxpayers affix to ethical
standards (at least as a tactical device in litigation) and suggests the
usefulness of ethical standards in helping shape litigation outcomes.
Admittedly, the ethical rules themselves do not set a standard for
234
imposing civil liability (i.e., several courts have declared that ethical
violations do not give rise to an independent or private cause of
235
action because ethical rules are specially designed to help the
236
general public and not a particular malpractice plaintiff).
230. See id. (“Allocation of greater resources specifically to ethics training and
remediation likely would have more of a salutary effect than public embarrassment
of the scarlet letter variety.”).
231. See infra Appendix (reporting that three federal cases have been brought that
included ethical violations related to tax shelters).
232. See American Bar Association, Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/discipline/sold/toc_2005.html (last visited Oct. 3,
2008) (listing disciplinary actions that it took against practitioners failing to meet
ethical standards); see also American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
Disciplinary
Actions,
http://www.aicpa.org/Magazines+and+Newsletters/
Newsletters/The+CPA+Letter/Disciplinary+Actions/default.htm (last visited Oct. 3,
2008) (cataloguing all disciplinary actions over the past seven years).
233. See infra Appendix (listing the types of claims on tax-shelter malpractice cases
after 1986).
234. See Robert Dahlquist, The Code of Professional Responsibility and Civil Damage
Actions Against Attorneys, 9 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1982) (“[N]early all courts that
have squarely considered the issue have held that a violation of ‘the Code of
Professional Responsibility is no basis for a private cause of action.’” (citation
omitted)); Charles W. Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of
Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C. L. REV. 281, 282–83 (1979) (“It will be seen
that to date the Code has actually not served as a very important source of assistance
to courts in private litigation.”); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. &
scope (2008) (stating that the rules “are not designed to be a basis for civil liability”).
But see Gary A. Munneke & Anthony E. Davis, The Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice:
Do the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Define It?, 22 J. LEGAL PROF. 33, 51–81 (1998)
(arguing that a breach of an ethics duty should be actionable as legal malpractice).
235. See, e.g., Miami Int’l Realty Co. v. Paynter, 841 F.2d 348, 351–52 (10th Cir.
1988) (holding that the expert’s testimony was not erroneously admitted because the
Code of Professional Responsibility was not presented as a force of law nor that
deviations from it constituted negligence per se); Fishman v. Brooks, 487 N.E.2d
1377, 1381 (Mass. 1986) (“A violation of a canon of ethics or a disciplinary rule is not
itself an actionable breach of duty to a client.” (internal citation omitted)).
236. See, e.g., Hilt v. Bernstein, 707 P.2d 88, 92–93 (Or. Ct. App. 1985)
(concluding that a violation of the disciplinary rules did not constitute negligence in
a civil action because the code is designed to regulate lawyers and protect their
clients).
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Nevertheless, many courts take the position that a violation of ethical
237
rules can be used as “rebuttable evidence” or at least “some
238
evidence of negligence” of professional malpractice.
A compelling body of literature also propounds that malpractice
litigation, rather than state bar associations, is the appropriate tool to
regulate lawyers. Commentators such as Professor Manuel R. Ramos
point out that state bar associations have historically done a lousy job
239
at self-regulation and that a much more efficient mechanism to
regulate lawyers and keep them in check is professional malpractice
240
litigation.
While Ramos’s views pertaining to legal malpractice
241
causes of action are not universally shared, the success of tax shelter
malpractice litigation stands as a testament to the validity of his and
other commentators’ views. Thus, the next part of this Article
suggests how the course of professional malpractice litigation can be
improved and further invigorated.
III. FACILITATING PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION
The active promotion of abusive tax shelters appears to have
ebbed: the threat of litigation brought by former clients, in
combination with new statutory penalties for abusive behavior and
stricter government oversight of tax practitioners, has chilled the

237. Martinson Bros. v. Hjellum, 359 N.W.2d 865, 875 (N.D. 1985); see Lipton v.
Boesky, 313 N.W.2d 163, 167 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (“We hold that, as with statutes, a
violation of the Code [of Professional Responsibility] is rebuttable evidence of
malpractice.” (citation omitted)).
238. See, e.g., Moriarty v. O’Connell, No. 001181, 2005 WL 1812513, at *3 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. June 30, 2005) (“[I]f a plaintiff can demonstrate that a
disciplinary rule was intended to protect one in her position, a violation of that rule
may be some evidence of negligence.”); Zuidema v. Pedicano, 860 A.2d 992, 1002
(2004) (“A violation of [a Rule of Professional Conduct] can be considered as some
evidence of negligence when taken into consideration with other evidence of
negligence.”).
239. See generally Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: Reforming Lawyers and Law
Professors, 70 TUL. L REV. 2583 (1996) (arguing that self-regulation and judicial
regulation of lawyers are ineffective); Ann Southworth, Note, Redefining the Attorney’s
Role in Abusive Tax Shelters, 37 STAN. L. REV. 889, 906 (1985) (“Self-regulation fails not
only because the bar sets insufficiently demanding standards of practice, but also
because it does not adequately enforce the standards it sets.”). Professor John
Leubsdorf is another strong proponent of regulating lawyers through malpractice
actions.
See John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility,
48 RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 105–20 (1995).
240. See Ramos, supra note 239, at 2600–08.
241. Several commentators have questioned the viability of malpractice actions to
regulate the legal field. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Ethics, NAT’L L.J., July 6, 1992, at
15; Lawrence W. Kessler, Alternative Liability in Litigation Malpractice Actions:
Eradicating the Last Resort of the Scoundrels, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 401, 411–22 (2000).
See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665
(1994) (surveying the ethical problems in the legal profession).
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242

abusive tax shelter marketplace. It is unclear how long this détente
will last, however, in the absence of additional enforcement efforts.
Thus, the final part of this Article recommends that Congress and
state lawmakers appreciate tax shelter malpractice litigation and its
role in fostering tax compliance, and institute reforms designed to
make malpractice actions an even more effective tool for tax
enforcement. Specifically, this analysis advocates that lawmakers
(1) address procedural roadblocks that favor defendant practitioners
and prevent plaintiff taxpayers from bringing malpractice actions,
(2) provide for significantly increased monetary recoveries for
plaintiff taxpayers who prevail in future tax shelter malpractice
actions, and (3) subject defendant practitioners to significantly
greater economic hardship and bad publicity for enabling abusive tax
avoidance.
A. Eliminating Procedural Roadblocks to Tax Malpractice Suits
When commencing a tax malpractice suit, taxpayers encounter
numerous procedural hurdles. These hurdles include determining
the applicable statute of limitations, establishing ripeness, and being
forced to arbitrate their claims. To win dismissal or force favorable
settlements, malpractice defense attorneys exploit these procedural
obstacles.
Background: Due to the statute of limitations, if taxpayers do not
bring a timely filed suit, their cases may become time-barred.
Determining the appropriate limitations period in a particular case,
however, is easier said than done. In fact, courts consider at least
four different possibilities for when a statute of limitations period
243
begins to run, including when (1) the malpractice occurs; (2) the
malpractice is discovered or, with reasonable diligence, is
discoverable; (3) the injury is suffered; and (4) the injury is
discovered or, with reasonable diligence, is discoverable. For tax
shelter investors, the statute of limitations may, depending upon state
242. See Rachel Emma Silverman, The Search for a Safe Tax Shelter, WALL ST. J., Oct.
13, 2005, at D1 (“Big accounting and law firms are being more cautious than in the
past, shying away from marketing aggressive shelters, especially those designed to
generate losses.”); Deconstructing the Tax Code: Uncollected Taxes and the Issue of
Transparency: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fed. Fin. Mgmt., Governmental Info. and
Int’l Sec. of the S. Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs Comm., 109th Cong. 10 (2006)
(written testimony of Hon. Mark Everson, Comm’r of Internal Revenue), available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/Everson926.pdf (“No longer are abusive tax
shelters being marketed by top level accounting firms.”); see also infra Appendix
(showing how the number of malpractice lawsuits peaked in 2005 and has gradually
declined in the ensuing years).
243. WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 10, § 601.2.3, at 461–62.
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law, commence when the tax adviser renders her advice; when the
investor taxpayer submits her tax return containing the claimed tax
benefits; when the IRS issues a public declaration invalidating a
transaction’s putative tax benefits (e.g., IRS Notice 2000-44, which
invalidated the abusive tax shelter commonly known as Son of
244
BOSS ); when the IRS audits the taxpayer’s tax return; when the
taxpayer settles with the IRS; or when the taxpayer litigates, loses, and
245
exhausts all appeal opportunities.
Consider the outcome of a recent case in which a taxpayer invested
in an abusive tax shelter known as the Foreign Loan Investment
246
Program (“FLIP”) in 1997.
Opinion letters sanctioning the
transaction were issued in 1998. In 2005, the IRS informed the
taxpayer that use of this tax shelter was illegal, and his losses were
disallowed. The taxpayer immediately thereafter commenced a
malpractice suit against the professionals who orchestrated the FLIP.
On the basis of New York’s three-year statute of limitations, however,
a federal district court dismissed the taxpayer’s lawsuit because the
taxpayer’s cause of action was deemed to accrue when the
malpractice occurred (i.e., in 1998 when the opinion letters were
issued), not at the point of discovery (i.e., in 2005 when the IRS
247
disallowed the losses).
While taxpayers may commence a cause of action too late, they may
also commence the action too early, thereby falling prey to the
248
In defining the doctrine, the U.S. Supreme
ripeness doctrine.
Court has said that a controversy “must be definite and concrete,
touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
249
With respect to tax shelter malpractice controversies,
interests.”
definiteness and concreteness typically apply only after the IRS has
250
assessed a taxpayer for back taxes, interest, and penalties. Without
an IRS determination, courts may dismiss tax malpractice claims on
244. I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255.
245. For an elaborate and comprehensive look at the issue of when the statute of
limitations commences in a malpractice case involving tax issues, see Jacob L. Todres,
Investment in a Bad Tax Shelter: Malpractice Recovery Is No Slam-Dunk, 2005 TAX NOTES
TODAY 69-29.
246. Arnold v. KPMG LLP, 543 F. Supp. 2d 230, 232–33 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
247. Id. at 235–36 (noting that the date of accrual is the date on which the
malpractice occurs, not when it is discovered or when injuries are suffered).
248. E.g., Hirshfield v. Winer, No. 87 CIV. 8079, 1989 WL 120584, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 3, 1989) (“The requirement that a conflict be ‘ripe’ for adjudication is one of
the fundamental rules of justiciability which have their origin in the case and
controversy requirement.”).
249. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937).
250. See Bowen v. First Family Fin. Serv., Inc., 233 F.3d 1331, 1339–40 (11th Cir.
2000) (holding that standing doctrine requires plaintiff to show actual injury).
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the theory that if the plaintiff taxpayer ultimately prevails in her
dispute with the IRS, the damage element in the malpractice case
251
would disappear.
In addition to statute of limitations and ripeness concerns, the
plaintiff taxpayer can be derailed by embedded arbitration clauses.
Tax shelter investors typically sign a myriad of legal documents
associated with their legal representation; these documents, in turn,
regularly contain provisions stipulating that any future disputes
252
between the signatories will be resolved through arbitration. Even
in cases where the parties did not reduce their agreement to
253
writing, courts have taken the position that if the tax shelter work
performed by the tax adviser for the taxpayer client relates to matters
251. See Loftin v. KPMG, No. 02-81166-CIV, 2003 WL 22225621, at *7 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 10, 2003) (dismissing the malpractice action because the taxpayer “has not
established that he suffered any injury stemming from Defendants’ alleged
misconduct” at the time when the plaintiff was in the process of negotiating a
settlement with the IRS at the commencement of the malpractice suit); Hirshfield,
1989 WL 120584, at *1–2 (dismissing the case because the future injury of the
plaintiff is entirely dependent upon the outcome of the IRS proceeding); Blumberg
v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 790 So. 2d 1061, 1064 (Fla. 2001) (stating that the plaintiff did
not incur damages); Snipes v. Jackson, 316 S.E.2d 657, 661 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that the plaintiff did not suffer actual loss until he was assessed by the IRS
and not at the time of the alleged negligent act).
252. In Stechler v. Diversified Group, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 2d 580 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), the
taxpayers entered into several agreements, including a limited liability agreement.
Contained in this agreement was the following arbitration clause: “[A]ny dispute,
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement shall be settled
promptly by arbitration.” Id. at 588. In Olson v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 461 F. Supp. 2d
710, 726 (N.D. Ill. 2006), the taxpayers entered into a retainer agreement with their
tax advisers that contained the following arbitration clause:
Arbitration. While we look forward to a mutually enjoyable relationship with
you, should any dispute arise between us, we mutually agree that such
dispute will be subjected to binding arbitration in Oakland County,
Michigan pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association and
that the arbitrators may award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing
party in such proceedings.
Note that ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 02-425
(2002), addresses the ethical propriety of having arbitration clauses in retainer
agreements. In order for such clause to be valid, according to the opinion, the
following conditions must be met:
(1) the client has been fully appraised of the advantages and disadvantages
of arbitration and has been given sufficient information to permit her to
make an informed decision about whether to agree to the inclusion of the
arbitration provision in the retainer agreement, and (2) the arbitration
provision does not insulate the lawyer from liability.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 02-425 (2002).
Notwithstanding this opinion, some states prohibit arbitration clauses in engagement
letters unless the client has independent legal representation (e.g., PA. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2008); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7304 (2008); OHIO PROF.
COND. R. 1.8(h)(1) (2008)).
253. See, e.g., Denny v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 340 F. Supp. 2d 348, 353 n.4 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (tax advice was rendered “pursuant to oral agreements, which of course
contain no arbitration clauses”).
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covered by other parties’ written agreements that did in fact contain
arbitration provisions, the adviser-taxpayer relationship would also be
254
Arbitration clauses
governed by those arbitration clauses.
generously sprinkled throughout governing tax shelter documents in
many instances have prevented taxpayers, whose tax shelter benefits
had been challenged and invalidated, from haling their former tax
255
advisers into court.
Proposed Reforms. Changing the rules with respect to statutes of
limitations, ripeness, and arbitration agreements will not be easy.
Individual states possess legitimate and persuasive reasons for
maintaining their own procedural rules. Nevertheless, given the tax
compliance benefits associated with tax shelter malpractice
256
litigation, this analysis recommends several procedural reforms to
enable greater use of malpractice suits as a way to discourage abusive
tax avoidance.
First, in tax shelter malpractice actions, the statute of limitations
should toll until the IRS proposes an assessment against the taxpayer.
This would provide a clear demarcation and date when the taxpayer
is on notice that a tax-reporting position is officially being
challenged. The recent tax shelter malpractice cases reveal that in
many instances tax shelter investors were not aware of their adviser’s
257
Taxpayers
misconduct until the IRS brought it to their attention.
certainly cannot discern on their own whether their tax advisers have
committed a tort or breached an implied contract, both of which
258
constitute essential ingredients of malpractice claims. Similarly, the
254. See, e.g., JLM Indus. Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 387 F.3d 163, 176–77 (2d Cir.
2004) (broad arbitration clause may extend to a collateral issue even where the
collateral issue involves no “issues of contract interpretation [or] construction, or
application of any provision of the charter,” if the collateral issue “touch[es] matters
covered by the parties’ agreements”).
255. See infra Appendix (delineating the fact that a significant number of cases
were dismissed); see also Schizer, supra note 176, at 368 (complaining about how the
“proliferation of arbitration clauses” erodes the effectiveness of malpractice
litigation).
256. See supra Part I.
257. Indeed, many tax advisers took several measures to shroud their misdeeds in
secrecy. Consider the actions of KPMG. To hide its tax shelter involvement, it
rejected “several internal recommendations by tax professionals to register a tax
product as a tax shelter with the IRS”; it recommended using “improper reporting
techniques on client tax returns to minimize the return information that could alert
the IRS to the existence of its tax products”; and, finally, to hide information, it
counseled tax professionals “not to keep certain revealing documentation in their
files.” MINORITY STAFF OF PERM. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. TAX SHELTER
INDUSTRY: THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTANTS, LAWYERS AND FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS, FOUR
KPMG CASE STUDIES: FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS AND SC2, S. REP. NO. 108-34, at 13–14 (2003).
258. See WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 10, § 601.1, at 459 (explaining that under tort
principles a lawyer has a duty to exercise skill, care, and diligence similar to other
members of the profession; while under contract theory, a tax practitioner, in
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taxpayer cannot accurately quantify potential damages associated
with the misconduct of its tax advisers—another essential component
of malpractice claims—until after receipt of the proposed IRS
259
assessment.
Several states toll their statute of limitations until damages are
discovered (i.e., typically, when the IRS makes an actual
260
assessment), while other states immediately commence the statute
of limitations when the malpractice itself is committed (i.e., when the
261
tax professionals render their advice). With respect to those states
that do not toll the statute of limitations period, plaintiff taxpayers
262
have a difficult time prosecuting their malpractice claims.
Until
lawmakers from these states alter their statutes to allow for tolling, tax
shelter advisers will continue to use the statute of limitations as a
defense, preventing future malpractice cases from even getting inside
the courthouse doors.
The ripeness doctrine requires that a case in controversy not be
263
subject to future contingent events.
In tax shelter malpractice
controversies, it is not entirely clear when a case becomes ripe. Some
courts have ruled that a case is ripe once discovery is made (i.e., the
264
IRS commences an audit); in contrast, other courts have ruled that
agreeing to represent a client, makes an implied promise of competent and diligent
representation).
259. See id. § 605.1, at 501 (explaining that in a professional tax malpractice cause
of action, proof of damages is an essential element).
260. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 339(1) (West 1995), interpreted by Int’l Engine
Parts, Inc. v. Fedderson & Co., 888 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Cal. 1995) (declaring that the
statute of limitations commences “at the time the IRS actually assesses the tax
deficiency”).
261. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214 (McKinney 2008); Glamm v. Allen,
439 N.E.2d 390, 394 (N.Y. 1982) (“What is important is when the malpractice was
committed, not when the client discovered it.”).
262. See, e.g., Arnold v. KPMG, 543 F. Supp. 2d 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (statute of
limitations bars plaintiff taxpayer’s claims); Hutton v. Deutsche Bank AG, 541 F.
Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Kan. 2008) (same); Curtis Inv. Co., LLC v. Bayerische Hypo-Und
Vereinsbank, No. 1:06-cv-2752, 2007 WL 4564133 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (same).
263. Peachlem v. City of York, Pa., 333 F.3d 429, 433–34 (3d Cir. 2003)
(delineating considerations that underpin the ripeness doctrine).
[A]re the parties in a sufficiently adversarial posture to be able to present
their positions vigorously; are the facts of the case sufficiently developed to
provide the court with enough information on which to decide the matter
conclusively; and is a party genuinely aggrieved so as to avoid expenditure of
judicial resources on matters which have caused harm to no one.
Id.
264. See, e.g., Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 363, 371
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (explaining that the case was ripe, even if the taxpayers did not owe
additional taxes). The court explained thus:
The Seippels allege that they have been damaged, and continue to be
damaged, as a result of defendants’ conduct. Their damages include the
fees paid to defendants, losses incurred in the COBRA transactions,
expenses paid to accountants and attorneys that are assisting the Seippels in
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a case is not ripe until the IRS assesses a tax and the taxpayer
265
Thus, absent the tolling of the
exhausts all of her appeal rights.
statute of limitations, plaintiff taxpayers face competing risks: on the
one hand, if they commence a cause of action when they become
aware of adviser misconduct but before the IRS has made an
assessment, courts may dismiss their cases under the ripeness
doctrine. On the other hand, if taxpayers wait until the IRS assesses a
tax, they might meet the requirements of the ripeness doctrine but
may fall victim to an expired statute of limitations. The easy solution
would be to toll the statute of limitations until the controversy
definitively ripens, which, in tax shelter malpractice cases, occurs only
after the IRS proposes an assessment.
Finally, plaintiff taxpayers suing their former tax professionals for
advising participation in an abusive tax shelter should not be
compelled to arbitrate their claims. Arbitration has virtues: it is
expedient, relatively inexpensive, and conducted in private. But
when it comes to abusive tax shelters, arbitration is not the answer.
Tax shelter malpractice cases should be painfully long, exorbitantly
expensive, and open to public scrutiny. Injecting these elements into
the process would weigh heavily against tax practitioners’ inclinations
266
to participate in abusive tax shelters. As discussed above, however,
tax practitioners have been afforded the opportunity to invoke
arbitration agreements and thus avoid the discomfort of court
267
proceedings. In addition, the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)
268
strongly favors arbitration as a means for resolving disputes. Faced
with signed arbitration agreements and the stated objectives of a
defending the audits, losses caused as a result of being forced to sell assets at
distressed prices to meet tax obligations, and tax penalties already assessed
and paid. These injuries are immediate and definite, and therefore satisfy
the case or controversy requirement contained in Article III of the
Constitution.
Id.
265. See Loftin v. KPMG LLP, No. 02-81166, 2003 WL 22225621, *7 (S.D. Fla. Sept.
10, 2003) (dismissing malpractice action in which the plaintiff was in the process of
negotiating a settlement with the IRS at the commencement of the malpractice suit
because the taxpayer “ha[d] not established that he suffered any injury stemming
from Defendants’ alleged misconduct”).
266. See supra notes 252–255 and accompanying text.
267. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2006). Under the FAA, arbitration may be compelled if a
party can show a written agreement to arbitrate, a dispute within the scope of the
arbitration agreement, and a refusal to arbitrate by the opposing party. Zurich Am.
Ins. Co. v. Watts Indus., Inc. 417 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2005).
268. See, e.g., ACE Capital Re Overseas Ltd. v. Cent. United Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d
24, 29 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that there exists “a strong federal policy favoring
arbitration” and, therefore, where “the existence of an arbitration agreement is
undisputed, doubts as to whether a claim falls within the scope of that agreement
should be resolved in favor of arbitrability” (citations omitted)).
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federal statute, courts have routinely held in favor of defense motions
dismissing malpractice claims and removing the proceedings to
269
In light of the strong public policy against
arbitration panels.
270
abusive tax shelters, however, Congress should amend the FAA to
provide that all arbitration clauses pertaining to abusive tax shelters
271
(as defined in Code § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii)) be considered null and
void unless defendant practitioners can demonstrate that such
provisions were specifically bargained for and not simply part of
boilerplate provisions contained in the tax shelter investment
materials.
The combination of these procedural reforms—tolling the statute
of limitations in the tax shelter malpractice context and nullifying the
vast majority of arbitration clauses connected with abusive tax shelter
representation—will remove current roadblocks to tax shelter
malpractice litigation, deterring tax professionals from participating
in the tax shelter marketplace and paving the way toward tax
compliance.
B. Increasing Taxpayer Recoveries
When taxpayers encounter financial hardship as a result of poor
professional advice, they harbor expectations of being made
financially whole if they commence a malpractice cause of action.
For reasons explained below, however, rarely do tax malpractice suits
secure this outcome. Furthermore, the tax professionals who
orchestrated the abusive tax shelters are often left financially
unscathed in the aftermath of these malpractice suits. This section
envisions reforms that would reverse both of these outcomes and
thereby make taxpayers (almost) financially whole and tax
professionals much more financially vulnerable.

269. See, e.g., Denney v. BDO Seidman, 412 F.3d 58, 68 (2d Cir. 2005) (ruling in
favor of the tax advisers’ motion to compel arbitration, holding that “in the absence
of any further evidence that the contract is illegal or seriously contrary to public
policy, such a factual finding does not suffice to render an entire contract void, and
an arbitration agreement unenforceable”); Collins & Aikman Prods. Co. v. Bldg. Sys.,
Inc., 58 F.3d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that “‘[f]ederal policy requires [the court]
to construe arbitration clauses as broadly as possible’” and, accordingly, “will compel
arbitration ‘unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is
not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute’” (citations
omitted)).
270. See, e.g., supra note 19 and accompanying text.
271. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) (Supp. 2005) (defining a tax shelter as a
“partnership or other entity, any investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan
or arrangement, if a significant purpose of such partnership, entity, plan, or
arrangement is the avoidance of federal income tax”).
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Background. When taxpayers institute tax malpractice cases, they
272
This
must declare the amount of damages they seek to recover.
amount, which represents all injuries proximately caused by the
273
defendant’s negligent conduct, is ordinarily comprised of several
different components: (1) transactional fees associated with the tax
shelter investment, (2) interest owed on unpaid taxes related to the
274
tax shelter investment, and (3) penalties imposed under the Code.
Recovery of each of these damage components presents taxpayers
with several challenges.
The first damage component is comprised of professional fees paid
pre-audit to secure the tax shelter investment, and post-audit to
275
correct the work that was performed. On its face, recovery of such
damages would appear routine: a tax professional charges a hefty fee
to put together a tax shelter in which the taxpayer invests, the IRS
disallows losses associated with the shelter, and the taxpayer must
spend additional money to remedy the tax professional’s error.
Nevertheless, tax professionals do not necessarily have to concede any
dereliction on their part and, thus, do not have to return any fees.
Instead, tax professionals can defend their actions based upon a
series of cases that protect practitioners from what is known as mere
276
errors in judgment.
The second damage component relates to interest that the
taxpayer owes resulting from the failure of the tax shelter to work as
272. See generally JAY M. FEINMAN, ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE:
LIABILITY OF
PROFESSIONALS AND BUSINESSES TO THIRD PARTIES FOR ECONOMIC LOSS (1995); Jacob
Todres, Tax Malpractice Damages: A Comprehensive Review of the Issues and Elements, TAX
LAW. (forthcoming 2008).
273. See, e.g., Pete v. Henderson, 269 P.2d 78, 79 (Cal. App. 1954) (in the case of
negligence, liability “is for all damages directly and proximately caused”).
274. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 25, § 16.1, at 890. Rewards for emotional pain
and suffering are atypical in the case of malpractice cases in which the primary injury
is financial in nature. See, e.g., Gautam v. DeLuca, 521 A.2d 1343 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1987); McCulloch v. Price Waterhouse L.L.P., 971 P.2d 414 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). In
unusual circumstances, courts may award punitive or exemplary damages. WOLFMAN
ET AL., supra note 10, § 605.1.3, at 504 (citing Midwest Supply, Inc. v. Waters, 510 P.2d
876 (Nev. 1970) (upholding a $100,000 jury award of punitive damages applied to a
return preparer who willfully and wantonly made false and fraudulent
representations and caused taxpayers to file erroneous claims for refund)).
275. See generally WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 10, § 605.2, at 505; Joseph L. Todres,
Malpractice and the Tax Practitioner: An Analysis of the Areas in Which Malpractice Occurs,
48 EMORY L.J. 547 (1999).
276. See WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 10, § 603.5, at 489 (“The ‘mere error in
judgment’ rule reflects the belief that, because of uncertainties in the facts and law,
along with constraints on the practitioner’s time, prediction of the probable
outcome of litigation is often difficult, and the standard of care should reflect this
difficulty.”); see, e.g., Martinson Mfg. Co., v. Seery, 351 N.W.2d 772, 775 (Iowa 1984)
(in rendering tax advice, “[i]f an attorney acts in good faith and in an honest belief
that his acts and advice are well founded and in the best interest of his client, he is
not held liable for a mere error of judgment” (citation omitted)).

324

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:267

planned. Recovery of this damage component, too, is embroiled in
controversy where courts embrace points of view that range over a
broad spectrum. At one end of the spectrum, some courts hold that
277
interest is not a recoverable component of damages. These courts
point out that since taxpayers could earn a return on the uncollected
tax dollars in their possession, any interest recovery would constitute
278
On the other end of the spectrum are
a windfall to the taxpayer.
279
These courts hold
those courts that permit full interest recovery.
that interest payments are part of the consequential damages that
taxpayers suffered as a result of making their failed tax shelter
280
investments.
A third view has recently emerged that is directly
between these polar positions. Courts embracing this middle view
allow taxpayers to collect the difference between the interest the
government charges and the amount of income the taxpayer was able
to actually earn on the funds while held in the taxpayer’s
281
possession.
The third component of damages relates to penalties imposed
282
In cases where
upon taxpayers who invest in abusive tax shelters.
courts have imposed penalties, taxpayers are likely to bring successful
malpractice recovery claims for the penalties paid. In stark contrast,
however, are those situations in which taxpayers settle with the IRS,
including making a penalty payment, and then sue their tax shelter
professionals for recovery.
In these instances, tax shelter
professionals argue that courts do not always impose penalties on tax
283
shelter investors; thus, had taxpayers continued to litigate rather
277. See, e.g., Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 315 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1990) (stating that “the equities militate in favor of barring recovery of
such interest rather than allowing plaintiffs the windfall of both having used the tax
monies for seven years and recovering all interest thereon”); Leendertsen v. Price
Waterhouse, 916 P.2d 449, 451 (Wash. App. 1996) (holding that “interest paid to the
IRS is not recoverable”). See generally Caroline Rule, What and When Can a Taxpayer
Recover from a Negligent Tax Advisor?, 92 J. TAX’N 176 (2000).
278. See, e.g., Leendertsen, 916 P.2d at 451.
279. See, e.g., Ronson v. Talesnick, 33 F. Supp. 2d. 347, 354 (D.N.J. 1999)
(permitting “recovery of IRS interest in accounting malpractice actions”); Wynn v.
Estate of Holmes, 815 P.2d 1231 (Okla. Civ. App. 1991) (declaring that interest
relating to tax malpractice claims is an element of recoverable damages).
280. See, e.g., Talesnick, 33 F. Supp. at 352–53 (ruling that damages were based on
interest owed to the IRS).
281. See, e.g., Streber v. Hunter, 221 F.3d 701, 717 (5th Cir. 2000) (taxpayers were
awarded the difference “between the interest the sisters actually earned while they
possessed the $1.7 million each and the interest charged by the IRS for such
possession”).
282. When it comes to abusive tax shelter investments, several penalty provisions
may come into play. See supra Part I.C.
283. See, e.g., Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d
885 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (holding that taxpayers’ losses associated with tax shelter
investment would be disallowed, but no penalties would be imposed because
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than administratively settle the matter, penalties might not have been
284
imposed. Accordingly, in malpractice litigation arising out of prior
IRS settlements, tax professionals may use this argument to defeat
285
penalty recoveries.
Proposed Reforms. Where do these observations leave taxpayers who
have invested in tax shelters that the IRS has successfully challenged?
Possibly in a much weaker negotiating position than they should be,
given the tumult they have endured. Below, this analysis posits
reforms that, if instituted, would bolster taxpayers’ negotiating and
litigating positions and produce more equitable outcomes—the
perfect motivation for taxpayers to engage in malpractice litigation.
Before discussing the particulars of these reforms, however, the
nature of those taxpayers who invested in tax shelters warrants
exploration. Concerning such taxpayers, the best that can be said is
that they invested in abusive tax shelters out of benighted trust,
complete ignorance, or the naïve belief that their trusted advisers had
special incantations that could legitimately make these investors’ tax
286
Accordingly, taxpayers who did not
burdens magically disappear.
make these or similar investments might rightfully say that these
abusive tax shelter investors should shoulder responsibility and bear
the financial consequences of their actions.
Even though these taxpayers were duped or purposefully engaged
in reprehensible tax-avoidance actions, lawmakers need to recruit
them to the side of preserving the integrity of the tax system. Think
of the alternative: tax professionals promote abusive tax shelters,
these shelters are uncovered, taxpayers are left holding the bag, and
the responsible tax professionals walk away with immunity to concoct
their next series of abusive tax shelters. From the perspective of the
lesser of two evils, certainly it would be much better if lawmakers
conscripted irate taxpayers to “punish” wayward tax professionals.
taxpayers purportedly had substantial authority for their position and reasonably
believed their shelter was legitimate). See generally Michael Schlesinger, Avoid Tax
Shelter Penalties When Transactions Are Under Attack, 73 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES (RIA) 4
(2004).
284. As an expert witness in several tax malpractice cases, I experienced firsthand
during pretrial negotiations how defense attorneys used cases in which penalties
were not imposed (e.g., Klamath, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885) to secure favorable settlement
terms.
285. Compare id., with King v. Deutsche Bank Ag, No. CV 04-1029, 2005 WL 611954
(D. Or. Mar. 8, 2005) (noting that defendant argued that since plaintiff did not settle
with the IRS, plaintiff should bear entire penalty burden).
286. See Paul J. Sax, Lawyer Responsibility in Tax Shelter Opinions, 34 TAX LAW. 5, 28
(1980) (speculating that the reason more malpractice suits were not brought against
tax practitioners was because “of guilt at having invested in a deception,
embarrassment in having been fooled, and the realization that a high-income
investor caught in a tax scam holds little appeal to a civil jury”).
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However, making taxpayers dollar-for-dollar whole or, alternatively,
awarding taxpayers punitive or exemplary damages would create a
perverse incentive for taxpayers to make tax shelter investments: if
the tax shelter investment went undetected, the taxpayer would save
countless tax dollars; conversely, if the tax shelter was detected, the
taxpayer could sue and secure a full recovery (and possibly a bonus if
punitive or exemplary damages were awarded). Either way, from a
financial perspective, the taxpayer would end up either ahead or
certainly no worse off. To eliminate this perverse incentive, the
suggested reforms detailed below would make the taxpayer close to
being financially whole, but not entirely. In particular, taxpayers
would still be out-of-pocket all of their legal expenses (i.e., the socalled American rule where each side bears its own legal expenses
287
would remain undisturbed), and, furthermore, taxpayers would not
be entitled to recover punitive or exemplary damages. Taxpayers
making abusive tax shelter investments (whether motivated by trust,
stupidity, or guile) must face sufficient financial risks to dissuade
them from making such investments in the first place.
Three suggested reforms will make taxpayers almost whole:
eradicating the mere error in judgment presumption, taking the
middle course for interest recovery, and allowing easier recovery of
penalties. All of these reforms come at the expense of tax
professionals and their insurance carriers.
First, the mere error in judgment defense should not shield
288
abusive tax shelter promoters from malpractice.
State lawmakers
should embed the following rebuttable presumption in their tort
laws: any time a tax practitioner promotes or advocates the use of a
so-called listed transaction (i.e., those transactions that the Treasury
289
Department has identified as tax-avoidance in nature) to save taxes
and this listed transaction subsequently fails to achieve its putative
tax-savings goal, the tax practitioner should be held liable for
negligence.
Second, consistent with the objective of making taxpayers almost
whole, courts should permit taxpayers to recover the difference
between (1) the interest charge imposed on their delinquent taxes
and (2) the income taxpayers earned on their unpaid tax dollars. As
a practical matter, most taxpayers cannot command, on an after-tax
287. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 124, at
897–98 (5th ed. 1984) (providing that absent a statutory provision or contractual
agreement, litigants bear their own attorney fees and litigation costs).
288. See supra notes 275–276 and accompanying text.
289. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (2008).
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290

basis, the interest rate charged under the Code; thus, disallowing
taxpayers any interest recovery will often result in an economic
shortfall. Conversely, awarding taxpayers the actual interest charge
imposed will result in an economic windfall. The middle course—
allowing taxpayers to recover the difference between the interest
charge imposed and the actual interest earned (a position some
291
courts now embrace) —is the most equitable recovery award.
Third, as previously indicated, when it comes to abusive tax
shelters, taxpayers who settle with the IRS, pay a penalty, and
subsequently sue their tax professionals for malpractice risk not
292
recovering the penalty they have paid.
Due to this economic
deterrent of being made whole, taxpayers are apt to litigate rather
than settle their differences with the IRS (because if the taxpayer
then loses against the IRS and pays a penalty, the taxpayer would be
much better positioned to obtain a full recovery in a malpractice
cause of action). To reverse this bias against settling with the IRS,
state lawmakers should institute the following rebuttable
presumption: in tax shelter malpractice actions, taxpayers can
recover penalties whether such penalties arose as a result of litigation
or settlement. Tax professionals could rebut this presumption only
in instances where they could prove that the investment in question
did not constitute an abusive tax shelter (as defined under Code
293
§ 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii)).
Institution of these proposed reforms will motivate taxpayers to
commence malpractice litigation against aggressive tax professionals
who promote abusive tax shelters. For tax professionals, these
reforms should prove sufficiently threatening to cause them to
render less aggressive tax advice.
C. Increasing Economic Exposure and Shaming Wayward Practitioners
Undoubtedly, tax professionals who arrange abusive tax shelters do
not like being sued. As a practical matter, no one likes his
professional skills put under a microscope or his personal integrity
questioned. However, under a pure cost-benefit analysis, if the
290. Under the Code, the interest rate on underpayments, late payments, or
nonpayments of tax equals the federal short-term rate plus three percentage points.
I.R.C. § 6621(a)(2) (2000). The federal short-term rate is defined in § 6621(b)(3) as
the federal short-term rate determined by the Secretary of the Treasury in
accordance with § 1274(d). Section 1274(d)(1)(C)(i) directs the Secretary to set the
short-term rate based on the market yield of U.S. obligations with less than three
years remaining before maturity.
291. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 283–284 and accompanying text.
293. Supra note 271.
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financial payoff is sufficiently large, it may more than offset the
inconvenience of a malpractice suit. Historically, when the tax
practitioner’s legal/accounting malpractice coverage is sufficiently
large, the financial downside risk of promoting abusive tax shelters
294
has been nearly nonexistent.
Therefore, to curb abusive tax shelters, in which billions of dollars
295
of tax revenue are at stake, Congress should strip tax professionals
and their firms of the financial insulation they have previously
experienced. More specifically, Congress should prohibit insurance
carriers from covering acts associated with the promotion of abusive
296
Were this coverage restriction in place, tax
tax shelters.
294. Carrie Johnson, Look Who’s Left Standing: Legal Penalties in Frauds Are Seldom
Paid by Legal Advisers, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2006, at D-1 (discussing how financial
institutions and accounting firms have paid out huge sums in connection with
wrongdoings such as those committed by Enron and KPMG, but that the sanctions
against law firms in connection with their conduct have been relatively small).
Indeed, some commentators even assert that tax professionals’ tax shelter
participation enhances their professional reputation. See, e.g., Ann Davis, Trading on
Enron Mystique: Veterans Flourish, Capitalizing on Links to Innovative Giant, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 16, 2006, at C1. In rare instances, however, tax shelter participation has cost tax
professionals their jobs. See, e.g., Blumenstein, supra note 204. Whatever the case,
given the lengthy time gap between shelter implementation, IRS discovery, and
taxpayers commencing malpractice cases, tax practitioners may feel immune for a
decade or more before they bear the repercussions of their derelictions. See generally
Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter Industry,
23 YALE J. ON REG. 77 (2006).
295. At the federal level, see, for example, Brostek Hearing, supra note 127
(estimating the tax losses associated with abusive tax shelters to be in the multibillion
dollar range); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO STUDY 06-171, TAX SHELTERS
(2005) (discovering that in the aggregate, during tax years 1998 through 2003, tax
shelters cost the United States an estimated $129 billion of lost revenue); Albert B.
Crenshaw, IRS Crackdown Nets $3.2 Billion, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2005, at E1 (“The
Internal Revenue Service has collected more than $3.2 billion in back taxes, interest
and penalties from participants in a single abusive tax shelter, including $100 million
from one taxpayer and $20 million each from 18 others, the agency said yesterday.”);
Martin A. Sullivan, One Tax Shelter at a Time?, 85 TAX NOTES 1226 (1999) (estimating
that abusive tax shelters may cost $30 billion annually). At the state level, see, for
example, MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N, CORPORATE TAX SHELTERING AND THE IMPACT ON
STATE CORPORATE INCOME TAX REVENUE COLLECTIONS (2003), available at
http://www.revenue.state.pa.us/tax_reform/lib/tax_reform/MTCtaxshelteringdocu
ment_FINAL.pdf (estimating the annual aggregate state revenue loss from tax
shelters to be in the range of $8.32 billion to $12.38 billion for fiscal 2001).
296. See Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers as Regulators of Law Practice,
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 211 (1996) (concluding that “[i]nsurers . . . are already in a
position formally to regulate their insureds”); see also Kenneth A. Gary, New
Opportunity for Tax Lawyers: Insuring Tax Transactions, 104 TAX NOTES 26 (July 5, 2004)
(describing how transactional tax insurance is an emerging trend); Kyle D. Logue,
Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 339 (2005). In this
paper, Professor Logue questions the merits of Congress permitting “tax indemnity
insurance or transactional tax risk insurance that provides coverage against the risk
that the Internal Revenue Service (Service) will disallow a taxpayer-insured’s tax
treatment of a particular transaction.” Id. at 339. Professor Logue concludes that
the “appropriate regulatory response is probably (a) to allow the purchase of policies
(and perhaps in some situations to subsidize their purchase) but (b) to compel
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professionals and their firms would bear all of the financial
consequences associated with their derelictions. And with this
financial weight on their shoulders, tax professionals would likely be
297
much more hesitant about promoting abusive tax shelters.
In addition, and unrelated to tax shelter malpractice litigation,
Congress should require that the IRS create a website known as the
“Tax Professional Wall of Shame.” Any tax professional who is
penalized under Code §§ 6700, 6707, or 6708 (i.e., those penalties
pertaining to failure to disclose and the promotion of abusive tax
shelters) would have her name posted for a period of two years.
Several states’ legislatures routinely shame delinquent taxpayers by
298
posting their names on the Internet; thus, there is no reason why
Congress should not institute this same shaming technique for
299
delinquent tax practitioners as well. At the state level, this shaming
300
technique has proven quite effective; at the federal level, adoption
of a similar shaming technique should likewise prove effective.
Succinctly put, no one likes her name besmirched before family,
friends, and the community.
***
One of the main purposes of the reforms suggested in Part III is to
undo the seemingly inseparable bonds between tax professionals and
taxpayers who participate in abusive tax shelter arrangements. Were
lawmakers to institute the reforms that this analysis advocates, tax
professionals would view clients in an entirely new light: general
acquaintance for the moment, possible adversary down the road. As
such, with respect to the professional advice they render, tax
taxpayers who purchase such policies to disclose this fact to the Service.” Id. at 339–
40.
297. See Toshiaki Lizuka, Do [sic] Higher Malpractice Pressure Deter Medical
Errors? 15–16 (Sept. 15, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/author=337399 (finding that higher liability pressures reduce
medical errors in two out of four obstetrics and gynecology procedures examined).
298. See Spies Online, Delinquent Taxpayers, http://www.spiesonline.net/
delinquent-taxpayers.shtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2008) (providing access to all state
shaming websites).
299. See generally supra note 205 and accompanying text. In other areas of the law,
the technique of shaming is becoming increasingly commonplace. See, e.g., Jennifer
Steinhauer, A Starring Role for Drivers Who Drink, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2007, at A16
(describing how one county posts the name and picture on a large billboard of any
driver convicted of driving under the influence).
300. See Stephan W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 U. KAN. L. REV.
1065, 1132 (2003) (pointing out states’ success in using Internet shaming
techniques); Tom Herman, Deadbeats Risk Cybershame, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2007, at
D2 (“California is relying on the threat of public humiliation to help collect millions
of dollars of overdue state income taxes.”).
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professionals would exercise much greater caution lest their
aggressive advice subsequently return to haunt them in the form of a
malpractice claim. By planting the seeds of mistrust in the tax
professional–taxpayer relationship insofar as abusive tax shelters are
concerned, the interests of tax practitioners and taxpayers would
converge with the interests of the government.
CONCLUSION
After the passage of the 1986 Act and the institution of other
legislative initiatives, many lawmakers and commentators
optimistically thought that abusive tax shelters had been dealt a fatal
301
blow.
Passive activity loss limitations, stiffer noncompliance
penalties, and higher ethical standards for practitioners would
presumably coax (or force) tax practitioners and taxpayers to be
compliant. Yet, this overly optimistic attitude quickly gave way to a
much grimmer reality: tax practitioners’ ingenuity and taxpayers’
greed resulted in the circumvention of these safeguards, resulting in
an onslaught of abusive tax shelters that have cost the nation’s coffers
302
billions of dollars in lost tax revenue.
From successful IRS interventions, tax shelter malpractice cases
have arisen. These cases have cast a bright, revealing light on the
inner workings of the seedier side of tax practice. This bright light
affords invaluable lessons, pinpointing where lawmakers should
direct their compliance reform efforts, particularly given the nation’s
limited tax enforcement resources.
One caveat that the tax malpractice cases reveal is that there is no
single silver bullet that lawmakers can discharge that will deal a fatal
303
blow to abusive tax shelter arrangements.
To curb abusive tax
shelters, lawmakers must instead launch a multi-prong strategy. In
considering various alternatives, lawmakers should recognize that tax
malpractice cases have had an important chilling effect on abusive
tax shelter formation. At least for the time being, anecdotal evidence
indicates that most attorneys and accountants are reluctant to
promote abusive tax shelters for fear of malpractice exposure. How
long this fear will last remains uncertain.
Why have malpractice cases been so effective in chilling tax shelter
formation? Tax practitioners know that, if sued, they must battle on a
301. See George K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson
from History, 54 SMU L. REV. 209 (2001) (discussing the initial success of the 1986 Tax
Reform Act in curbing abusive tax shelters).
302. See supra note 295.
303. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 36.
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level playing field (from a resource and information perspective),
they will endure financial and emotional distress, they will be shamed
and humiliated before the entire community, and they may be
deemed to have violated governing ethical standards. Given all of the
negatives associated with these lawsuits, practitioners would prefer to
avoid them.
Lawmakers must build upon the successes brought about by these
malpractice cases.
In particular, lawmakers should expand
opportunities for taxpayers to bring malpractice cases against
professionals involved in abusive tax shelter arrangements. Consider
what would happen were the reforms pertaining to malpractice
causes of action, and described in this Article, instituted. Tax
malpractice cases would be easier to bring, plaintiffs would be more
likely to prevail with larger financial awards, and defendant tax
professionals (rather than their insurance carriers) would be more
susceptible to bearing the costs of their own defalcations. The
downside risk of participating in abusive tax shelters would increase
by several orders of magnitude. In terms of ensuring the integrity of
our tax system, this would be a good thing.
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APPENDIX
Post–1986 Tax Reform Act Professional Malpractice Cases Pertaining to
Abusive Tax Shelters
Case Dynamic/Feature
Federal
State
Total
1. Cases/Motions in Which the
26
4
30
Plaintiff Prevailed*
2. Cases/Motions in Which the
19
4
23
Defendant Prevailed
3. Cases in Which “High-Profile” Firms Were Named
Defendants
22
2
24
a. Deutsche Bank
13
5
18
b. Sidley Austin
13
3
16
c. KPMG
8
0
8
d. Jenkens & Gilchrist
7
1
8
e. BDO Seidman
3
0
3
f. PricewaterhouseCoopers
4.
Cases in Which Negligence Allegations Included Ethics
Violations
1
0
1
a. Generally
2
0
2
b. Circular 230
5.
Cases in Which Common Defenses Were Raised
6
2
8
a. Statute of Limitations
14
4
18
b. Arbitration Clause
6. Shelter Type
16
0
16
a. COBRA
6
2
8
b. OPIS
4
4
8
c. Other
6
1
7
d. DOS
7
0
7
e. BLIPS
5
0
5
f. FLIPS
1
0
1
g. SOS
1
0
1
h. CARDS
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Case Dynamic/Feature
Cases/Motions Reported by Year
2008 (through June 30, 2008)
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
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Federal

State

Total

3
3
11
20
5
1

1
3
3
0
0
0

4
6
14
20
5
1

* Many cases/motions in which plaintiffs prevailed included class
action suits involving hundreds of plaintiffs. These class action suits
make these numeric tallies somewhat misleading. See supra note 1.

